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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
When a computer security attack spreads throughout the world, data can be destroyed or 
stolen and productivity lost on a massive scale. Across seven wide-spread worms and viruses, an 
estimated $24.68 billion was spent in cleanup and lost productivity (Swartz, 2003). While these 
numbers are derived from mostly corporate sources, the effect on a household level is no less 
devastating. Over half of all U.S. households have Internet access (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005). Each 
device connected to the Internet is capable of being devastated by any number of security threats 
originating from practically anywhere in the world. Even without one's own computer, any one of 
the estimated 604 billion Internet users (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2005) can become a victim 
of a computer security threat to their personal information. Understanding how information about 
computer security reaches end users is vital to the prevention of extensive damages and frustrations. 
Computer security has expanded from the focus of businesses with large networks to include 
individual personal computer owners. Computers have made a huge shift in availability over their 
lifetime. When first introduced, computers were single mainframe systems occupying entire rooms, 
costing huge amounts of money, and requiring a full staff to operate. Current computers have 
exponentially more processing power than their gigantic ancestors, and they pack all that power into 
a device that fits under a desk, can be purchased for less than a thousand dollars at a local Wal- 
MartTM, and are used by people that may have little or no prior experience. 
In 2004, high-speed Internet access in the U.S. soared 34 percent to 37.9 million connections, 
with less than five percent of zip codes without the option of high-speed connections (Broache, 2005). 
Due to the extensive availability of high-speed Internet, within a matter of minutes someone's home 
computer can be accessible to those outside that home on a regular basis, either for productive 
communication needs or malicious attacks. No longer does a computer attack require physical access 
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to the target machine. An unpatched computer connected to high-speed Internet can be compromised 
in a matter of minutes (SANS Internet Storm Center, n.d.). 
With this spread to the general public, securing computers became more difficult while 
receiving less attention by the average computer user. On the individual computer user level, 
successful computer security exploitation can cost lost time, data, and money; and recovery is not 
always guaranteed. Time is spent attempting to fix the problem and can be lost when computer 
productivity is hindered by security threats embedded in a system, devouring processing capabilities 
for their own purposes. Throughout this process, users' personal data can be destroyed, corrupted, or 
stolen for identity or intellectual property theft. 
Organizations, on the other hand, are no longer faced with the dilemma of securing a single, 
large multi-user system; they must secure each and every computer used by their employees. 
Corporations and government units face all the individual losses that can occur from naive 
employees with greater potential damages from data theft or loss, but also must consider expending 
the resources to train employees on security. On the lowest level, information technology 
departments may have a large work load just keeping their users productive; a study of office 
workers in the U.K. found that 14 percent of employees needed help simply switching their 
computers on or off, 20 percent have difficulties saving documents, and more than 21 percent need 
assistance printing (City &Guilds, n.d.). In a Trend MicroTM survey of corporate end users (2005), 58 
percent of victims of malicious e-mails, just one type of computer security threat, reported having 
their privacy violated and 21 percent reported also losing corporate information. 
Computer attacks can take advantage of vulnerabilities in a number of areas. Attacks can 
target flaws in a computer's operating system or its base components, flaws in the software a 
computer runs, or flaws in computer user's behavior. Some attacks can be user-initiated, such as 
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opening a executable e-mail attachment or clicking through a link to a fake version of a corporate 
website; other attacks can come and go without the user knowing, leaving behind a back door for 
future abuse. 
No matter the threat or the damages, preventative measures begin with awareness of an 
issue. Mass media sources play a large role in creating this awareness in users (Rogers, 2003). If large-
distribution media outlets covered computer vulnerabilities and protection measures as soon as they 
are released, the potential devastation by a threat could be greatly reduced. 
Diffusion of innovation research helps to articulate this distribution of information by 
looking at how innovations are communicated to people from media sources and members of social 
systems. Diffusion of innovation research can predict and evaluate how the public is informed and 
can provide predictions about the traits of certain types of innovation adopters. 
This paper looks at how computer security threats are communicated through mass media 
outlets by analyzing the coverage threats receive. The work in this thesis is just the first step in 
analyzing how computer end-users become aware of security issues that may seriously affect them. 
This knowledge can be used to better understand how information about computer security threats 
reaches the public. This understanding can then be used to direct future efforts for improving the 
computer security diffusion process and limiting the extensiveness of damage, costs, and frustrations 
caused the attacks. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review will define computer security, discuss some of the dangers of threats to 
computer security, and provide a few examples of threats that wreaked havoc on computers and 
networks around the globe. After covering computer security, diffusion of innovation will be 
discussed; providing a definition and details of the innovation-adoption process, details on the main 
definition components of diffusion of innovation, and criticisms to diffusion of innovation research. 
Computer Security 
Computer security is broadly defined by its three components: confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability (Bishop, 2003). The goal of confidentiality is keeping resources hidden from unauthorized 
entities. Integrity refers to maintaining the trustworthiness of resources that an entity uses. Lastly, 
availability refers to the ability of an entity to use desired resources. A systems security depends on 
prevention of attacks, detection of attacks (when they cannot be prevented), and recovery from an 
attack. 
Computer Security Threats 
Computer security threats are defined as potential violations of security (Bishop, 2003). 
Common threats to computers are collectively referred to as malware, any computer code with a 
malicious purpose. Malware can include a number of different threats (although some of these items 
have innocuous versions): adware, back doors, cookies, dialers, hijackers, key loggers, spyware, 
Trojan horses, viruses, worms, and zombie PCs (Rathbone, 2006). Malware threats often take 
advantage of a vulnerability in a computer's operating system. Sometimes, these vulnerability 
exploits are created by dissecting the patches designed to correct the problem, thereby infecting the 
many users that are not as quick to update their systems. The most extensive of these problematic 
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items are worms, viruses, and Trojan horses. Social engineering, the term for the tactics used to entice 
desired information from individuals and organizations that can range from e-mail scams to 
something as simple as calling secretaries to ask for passwords, is also a growing problem but will 
not be addressed in this paper. 
When a new piece of malware is capable of reproducing and spreading quickly, it is often 
described as a "worm." When worms start spreading without user interaction they often create 
denial-of-service situations where everyday and necessary traffic are no longer able to get through 
computer networks. A worm can often be a component of another threat such that it is a propagation 
method for a virus or Trojan horse. Viruses exploit a user's actions (though sometimes through a 
user's system and software choice and not through user direct system interaction) to launch some 
unauthorized computer code. True to their namesake, Trojan horses perform an expected action 
while simultaneously performing some unexpected, typically malicious, operation with or without 
the user's awareness. These security threats are classified into four areas by the result of their actions: 
deception, acceptance of false data; disclosure, unauthorized access to information; disruption, denial 
or interruption of correct operation; and usurpation, unauthorized control of all or part of a system 
(Bishop, 2003). 
One such quickly-spreading worm was the Nimda worm, first discovered September 18, 2001 
(Tocheva et al., 2001). Nimda actually had four attack methods: infecting files on the host computer, 
e-mailing infectious copies of itself to others found on the host computer file system and retrieved 
from the host's a-mail software, scanning from the infected machine for known security holes on 
Internet web servers and altering site content, and attempting propagation through local networks 
(Tocheva et al.). 
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Often, malware items are given unique, rarely descriptive, names (such as the Nimda worm 
mentioned above) that are used to easily describe the software in removal or protection software or 
simply for consistent discussion. Sometimes, though, many names are assigned to the same threat 
over the course of its active lifetime, occasionally settling on the most common variant name. These 
name are sometimes strictly proper nouns with no English meaning such as Nimda, Klez, Welchia, 
Sobig, and Zotob exploit malware. When names are not invented proper nouns, they are often 
descriptive terms or phrases that would rarely appear outside of a work about the malware, 
examples being SQL Slammer, Blaster, and Code Red. This unique nature of malware names, 
ahhough not always completely inclusive, is the motivation for their use in this study. 
Lifespan of a Threat 
When a new threat is discovered, its diffusion to the public is based on what type of person 
or group finds it first. In an ideal situation, a new threat is first discovered by a party interested in 
malntalning S2CUrlty, such as the software vendor or a vendor of security products. In the case of the 
software vendor, they ideally would post notification of the potential exploit along with creating an 
update to the software that would fix it as soon as possible. In a negative situation, a threat is first 
discovered by a malicious entity. They, in turn, either create an exploit of the threat or notify someone 
who could create such an exploit. This exploit could then be used on a mass number of computer 
systems before it is even found by a concerned party. 
There have even been attempts in the past to make worms that, after exploiting a 
vulnerability, try to patch and protect the very system it infected (Perriot &Knowles, 2004). The 
Welchia worm was a modified version of the Sobig worm, a piece of malware that would propagate 
itself by sending copies of the malicious computer code through e-mails and installing hidden back 
doors in machines found by scanning for other vulnerable Internet-connected machines. Once a 
machine was infected with the Welchia, though, this piece of malware would attempt to download 
security updates for the host machine before scanning for others to "infect" (Perriot &Knowles). 
While the worm's author is believed to have had positive intentions, the traffic created by systems 
downloading patches and scanning for other computers to help created similar denials-of-service to 
those of the worms it tried to remove. 
Another positive attempt at a worm was created by the author of a malicious worm that took 
down computer systems in hospitals, post offices, airlines, railways, and the British coastguard (BBC 
News, 2004). The author modified the original code to warn users about infection and instruct them 
on protection measures (Trend Micro, 2004). 
No matter how a security threat is found, after a protection mechanism such as a patch of 
software update is created to fix the problem, it must get to the affected end users. In fact after some 
protection measures are released, exploits are created by examining these measures for details on the 
vulnerability. This places even greater need on updating systems since the longer a system is not 
updated the more likely it is that an exploit may exist on a known vulnerability. Some systems are 
designed, or can be configured, to update automatically without user interaction or even awareness, 
but most systems require an intentional system update by either the end user or an administrator in 
charge of their system. In the later case, these update initiators must have awareness that a problem 
exists, potentially solved by mass media coverage. Little research has been done regarding the 
media's coverage of computer security threats. 
Diffusion of Innovation 
Diffusion of innovation will provide the framework for analyzing the media coverage of 
computer security threats. Modern research has been done in the area of diffusion of innovation 
covering nearly all of the components of its definition, "the process in which (1) an innovation (2) is 
8 
communicated through certain channels (3) over time (4) among the members of a social system" 
(Rogers, 2003, p. 11). Researcher has been done in each of these components individually and in 
many combinations of multiple components. 
History of Diffusion Research 
Diffusion research started, though with different concepts from current research, as "the laws 
of imitation" described by Gabriel Tarde, a French lawyer and judge who tracked trends in his 
society around 1900 (Tarde, 1903 as cited in Rogers, 2003). Tarde observed the legal cases that came 
before his court in an effort to explain why a vast majority of innovations would be lost and only a 
handful would spread. Tarde's observations of adoption showed the trademark S-shaped diffusion 
curve that is seen in present day diffusion of innovation research, even noting the quick take-off 
when opinion leader adoption occurred. 
A study of the 1940 presidential election started with the goal of determining how mass 
media brought about change, but instead stumbled on the beginnings of diffusion research called the 
two-step flow model (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944). This study, instead of reinforcing the hypodermic 
needle model, a theory hypothesizing that mass media channels have significant power and influence 
over audience decisions, found that more people were influenced by face-to-face interactions than 
mass media attention (Lazarsfeld and Menzel, 1963). Diffusion research later showed that more than 
just opinion leaders use mass media channels for information and that mass media channels are used 
in later stages in the decision process (Rogers, 2003). 
The first modern diffusion of innovation research started through two independent research 
paths, farmer adoption of agricultural innovations (Ryan 8~ Gross, 1943) and teacher adoption of 
education method innovations (Mort, 1957). Diffusion research has been applied also to 
anthropology (Lansing, 1991; Wellin, 1955), sociology (Ryan &Gross, 1943), education (Allen, 1956; 
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Carlson, 1965; Wollons, 2000), public health and medical sociology (Menzel 8~ Katz, 1955; Singhal 8~ 
Rogers, 2003; Valente, 1995), communication (Deutchmann &Danielson, 1960; Lin &Atkin, 2002; 
Mayer, Gudykunst, Perrill, &Merrill, 1990), marketing and management (Bass, 1969; Fox &Kotler, 
1980), geography (Hagerstrand, 1952), and general sociology (Grattet, Jenness, &Curry, 1998; 
Holden, 1986; Soule, 1999). Research in these topics get grouped into macro diffusion studies, studies 
of the rate or pattern of adoption across a social system, or adopter studies, studies of the 
characteristics of the adopters themselves. 
Diffusion of innovation research is often characterized by the S-shaped adoption curve over 
time and, based on divisions of that S-curve, various adopter categories: innovators, early adopters, 
early majority, late majority, and laggards (described in detail later). These time-grouped adopters 
each go through the innovation-decision process: knowledge of the innovation, attitude formation 
(Rogers refers to this as the persuasion stage), decision of adoption or rejection, implementation of 
the innovation, and confirmation of the decision. 
The three main perspectives that are used to analyze diffusion of innovation are adoption, 
market/infrastructure, and geographic/flow-based (Brown, 1981). The primary adoption approach 
suggests that every adoption unit has an equal opportunity to adopt an innovation. Similarly, aflow-
based diffusion model depicts adoption as primarily the outcome of a learning or communication 
process (Hagerstrand, 1967), seeking to identify factors that regulate the effectiveness of information 
flow. In contrast the market/infrastructure perspective identifies diffusion agencies as the strongest 
adoption influences (Brown). 
These perspectives are typically studied through eight types of diffusion research (Rogers, 
2003): earliness of knowing about innovations (Deutschmann &Danielson, 1960; Mayer, et al., 1990; 
Miller, 1945), rate of adoption of different innovations in a social system (Fliegel & Kivlin, 1966), 
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innovativeness (such as Rogers, 1961), opinion leadership (Kelly, et al., 2000), diffusion networks 
(Coleman, Katz, &Menzel, 1957), rate of adoption in different social systems (Rogers &Kincaid, 
1981), communication channel use (Ryan &Gross, 1943), and consequences of innovation (Sharp, 
1952). 
Innovation Adoption Process 
Ultimately, much of diffusion of innovation research seeks to successfully lead individuals 
through the innovation-adoption process. This process entails five steps, in order (except when 
decision is preceded by a persuasion such as when an innovation is mandated by an authority 
figure): knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation (Rogers, 2003). The entire 
process is supplemented at each step (especially the knowledge step) by the three types of knowledge: 
awareness-knowledge, how-to knowledge, or principles-knowledge (Rogers). 
The knowledge stage is the point where an adoption unit gains awareness of an innovation 
and eliminates uncertainty by gaining understanding of how it functions. Awareness can start either 
through passive exposure to an awareness-knowledge of an innovation (such as physician exposure 
to new medications through advertising in medical journals, Coleman et al, 1966) or from actively 
seeking awareness-knowledge. Awareness is created more successfully if a prior need exists 
(Hassinger, 1959). How-to information is obtained to assist with implementing an innovation and 
principles-knowledge is used to further understand an innovation on a more detailed level. 
After awareness of an innovation and once an adoption unit works on establishing a 
favorable or unfavorable attitude toward the innovation, they are in the persuasion stage. This stage is 
marked by a shift from the cognitive pursuits of the knowledge stage to affective actions lead by an 
individual's attitude toward an innovation (Rogers, 2003). This is also the stage when individuals 
assign perceptions of credibility to the sources from which they receive the three types of knowledge 
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information. Also affecting adoption during the persuasion stage are the five perceived 
characteristics of an innovation: relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability 
(Rogers). Relative advantage is the perception that an innovation will supersede previous ideas 
(measured in economic terms, social prestige factors, convenience, and satisfaction). Compatibility is 
the perception of consistency with existing needs and experiences. Complexity is the perception of 
difficulty of use or understanding. Trialability is the ability to experiment with the innovation prior to 
complete adoption. And Observability is the visibility of the innovation results to others. 
The decision stage is the engagement in activities leading to adoption or rejection of an 
innovation. The decision stage can involve the trial use of an innovation, if possible, by the individual 
or a peer (Rogers, 2003). Although adoption or rejection activities are being engaged in this step, a 
decision can be reached at any of the innovation-decision stages. A decision can come about through 
acceptance and adoption, discontinuance (an example being simply forgetting about an innovation), 
active rejection (rejection after a trial use of an innovation, for instance), or passive rejection (never 
considering an innovation for adoption). 
If a unit adopts an innovation, the implementation stage is when that innovation is put to use. 
Implementation marks a shift from the previous mental processes to the behavioral change to put an 
innovation into practice. An innovation can be implemented in its original state or re-invented to 
adapt to an individual's or social system's unique needs (Charters & Pellegrin, 1972). 
Finally, the confirmation stage occurs after implementation or rejection of an innovation when 
an adoption unit seeks reinforcement of their decision. Following adoption of an innovation, an 
individual may still seek out information about the innovation (Mason, 1962). During the 
confirmation stage, an adoption unit may reverse an adoption decision and discontinue the use of an 
innovation (or reverse a rejection decision to begin use) if they are exposed to conflicting messages. 
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Diffusion of Innovation Components 
Diffusion of innovation is the communication of messages concerned with new ideas —
innovations. Innovations are things considered new based on the perception of the adopting unit 
(individuals, informal groups, organizations, and subsystems) and not on an actual measurement of 
time since discovery. "If an idea seems new to the [adoption unit], it is an innovation" (Rogers, 2003, 
p. 12). Rogers (2003) criteria for diffusion of innovation describes four components: innovation, 
communication, time, and a social system. The innovation in question becomes the basis for the 
remaining components: communication, time, and social system. 
Innovation 
Although the remaining components are researched from a starting point of a selected 
innovation, the innovation itself is not without impact on the adoption process. Rogers (2003) 
identifies five characteristics that will affect innovation adoption speed. Perceived attributes of 
innovations can lead to differing adoption rates. The five perceptioned attributes of innovations, as 
detailed above, are relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability. 
Innovations perceived to be better in these traits will be adopted more rapidly (Roger). Research even 
suggests that the perceptions of innovation characteristics are more important than other measurable 
characteristics (Downs &Mohr, 1976). 
Besides perceptions, there are also characteristics of the innovation itself that can act as 
obstacles to diffusion, the largest being the costs associated with adopting an innovation (U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development [HUD], 1976). These costs can be initial costs to 
adopt an innovation such as the cost to buy a new technology, recurring costs such as maintenance 
costs for a new technology, and sunk costs such as the costs already applied to currently used 
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technologies to be replaced (a potential deterrent despite being irrelevant from an accounting 
perspective) (HUD). 
Communication 
Communication is the process through which participants attempt to reach mutual 
understanding by creating and sharing information with one another (Rogers, 2003). Diffusion takes 
place through social networks by means of communication of information from a diffusion agent 
(someone who seeks to bring about adoption of an innovation) to adopters and between the adopters 
of various levels of innovativeness. Each adopter can potentially serve as an opinion leader to 
influence adoption by another person within their social system. In the initial stages of diffusion, 
information gathering is the primary function, often facilitated by change agents and others with a 
motivation to address positive aspects of an innovation due to their economic benefit from adoption 
(Rogers). 
The information that reaches the mass media shows special importance to earlier adopters 
(Rogers, 2003). Mass media channels are typically the quickest and most efficient means of creating 
awareness knowledge about the existence of an innovation in an audience of potential adoption 
units. Interpersonal communication takes on more importance later in the adoption decision process 
and as later adopters seek information, "especially if the interpersonal channel links two or more 
individuals who are similar in socioeconomic status, education, or other important ways" (Rogers, p. 
18). 
Although first adopters place more importance on scientific studies of innovation 
consequences, most individuals do not evaluate an innovation based on these studies. Most people 
depend on subjective evaluations from previous adopters similar to themselves to reduce uncertainty 
and assist with evaluation of innovation consequences. The similarities between two communicating 
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adoption units is termed by Rogers (2003) as homophilous, the degree to which two or more 
interacting units are similar in certain attributes (like beliefs, education, and socioeconomic status). 
Communication items such as newspaper articles, television news clips, and Internet articles 
can affect an individual's innovation-decision process. When it offers information for the knowledge 
step of this process, studies classify the information presented in the categories described earlier: 
awareness-knowledge, how-to knowledge, and principles-knowledge (Rogers, 2003). 
Awareness generated from major news events is also studied in a subset of diffusion 
research, diffusion of news. While diffusion of innovation is concerned with the spreading of a new 
idea, diffusion of news is focused on the communication portion of diffusion as awareness of news 
events spreads among the public. Diffusion of news looks to determine three major components of 
individual awareness: what people know about an event, when they first learned about an event, and 
from what source they first learned about an event. News diffusion research has been done on such 
events as President John F. Kennedy's assassination (Greenberg, 1964) and the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks (Rogers &Seidel, 2002). 
Serving as a starting point for modern news diffusion research, a study of President Franklin 
Roosevelt's death sought to determine how news of this major event spread (Miller, 1945). Miller 
surveyed 147 Kent State University students and found that the mass media were used to verify 
event information. 
A later seminal work in diffusion of news was a study by Paul Deutschmann and Wayne 
Danielson. The Deutschmann and Danielson (1960) study surveyed news diffusion of major and 
minor news events within Lansing, Michigan; Madison, Wisconsin; and Palo Alto, California. Within 
30 hours of the major news events (President Eisenhower's heart attack, the Explorer I Satellite 
launch, and Alaska's statehood announcement in this study), 75 to 95 percent of the public knew of 
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the event (Deutschmann &Danielson, 1960). Mass media sources such as radio, television, and 
newspapers were cited as respondents' initial communication sources more than interpersonal 
networks; two-thirds of respondents, though, did report having conversations about the events 
(Deutschmann & Danielson). A study of the Challenger explosion in 1986 also found spectacularly 
quick diffusion, with half of a sample of Pheonix, Arizona residents hearing of the disaster within 30 
minutes (Mayer et al, 1990). 
Time 
Rogers (2003) defines time in a number of prior research measurements: the lapse from first 
knowledge into adoption or rejection on an individual level (Coleman, Katz, &Menzel, 1966); the 
earliness/lateness of adoption with respect to others in a social system (Deutschmann & Fals Borda, 
1962; Coleman, Katz, &Menzel, 1966); and the overall rate of adoption of an innovation for an entire 
group (Kaplan, 1999). 
The measurement of time for unit adoption or rejection involves measuring the innovation-
decision process detailed above: knowledge, persuasion, decision, implementation, and confirmation. 
Time can measured between stages and across all stages. 
Earliness of adoption by a member of a social system is measured relative to others adopters 
in their social system. This earliness of adoption is termed innovativeness, which Rogers (2003) 
defines as "The degree to which an individual or other unit of adoption is relatively earlier in 
adopting new ideas than the other members of a system" (p. 22). The level of innovativeness in an 
adoption unit decides the adopter category as distinguished by Rogers. The first 2.5 percent of 
adopters are called innovators. The second category and next 13.5 percent are early adopters. Early 
majority is the category for the next 34 percent and late majority for the 34 percent after that. The 
remaining 16 percent are called laggards. 
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These adopter groupings expose some common factors among members (Rogers, 2003). 
Innovators, for instance, are "active information seekers about new ideas, have a high degree of mass 
media exposure, and their interpersonal networks extend over a wide are, reaching outside their local 
system" (p. 22; see also Ryan &Gross, 1943). Innovators also have a higher level of tolerance for 
uncertainty about innovations but can also be seen as too innovative to later potential adopters (Mort, 
1959). Early adopters will have a higher socioeconomic status (Wei, 2001) and, when compared to later 
categories, have a higher ability to take risks and use more media sources. The late majority have 
"relatively lower socioeconomic status, makes little use of mass media channels, and learns about 
most new ideas from peers via interpersonal communication channels" (p. 22). Lastly, laggards show 
a conservative and suspicious attitude toward innovations (Wei, 2001). They will also have relatively 
limited resources for accessing new innovations. Wei (2001) found that many of the first adopters of 
cell phones in Hong Kong were more educated and of higher socioeconomic status than the later 
laggards that were skeptical of the cell phone's complexity and capabilities. 
While the adopter categories of an innovation resemble a bell curve, their cumulative rate 
follows awell-documented S-shaped curve (Rogers, 2003). Although certain events and innovation 
characteristics can alter the slope of the S-curve, it always starts with a slow rise with the first 
beginning adopters. Adoption accelerates quickly until about half the system adopts the innovation, 
where it increases gradually as fewer and fewer remaining individuals adopt an innovation (Mahler 
8~ Rogers, 1999). This effect is commonly referred to as critical mass, when diffusion of an innovation 
becomes nearly self-sufficient after enough of an adopter base has been established (Rogers). 
Social System 
The final part of Rogers (2003) definition of diffusion of innovation, the social system through 
which an innovation's adoption is spread, is defined as a collection of interrelated units, whether they 
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are individuals, informal groups, organizations, and/or subsystems, that work to solve shared goals 
collectively. The structure of the system is an arrangement of its units based on their behavior, 
hierarchical positions, or informal structures of who interacts with whom and under what 
circumstances that is acceptable. This structure lends a level of predictability to the behavior of a 
system and also works to establish acceptable behavior patterns (Rogers). 
The structure of a social system is critical to diffusion within it, with potential for hindering 
or helping (Katz, 1961). Structure is defined by the extent of dissimilarity between units of a system, 
defining patterns of units by behavior, hierarchical positions, or informal structures of who interacts 
with whom in what situations (Rogers, 2003). 
Units in a system may have similar attributes, defined earlier as the degree of homophilous. 
This level of similarity is crucial to the success of innovation communication, that is, whether 
communication between two units will result in adoption by the receiving unit. In an ideal learning 
communication, one unit is heterophilous in only the matter of the innovation being discussed and 
homophilous in as many other ways as possible (Rogers, 2003). The successful nature of homophilous 
communication is often used by change agents, a representative of a change agency that wishes to 
obtain adoption of a new idea within a system they most likely do not belong (Rogers et al., 1995). 
Since a change agent may not be a member of a system, they may be too heterophilous to 
engage in successful communication with the system's members themselves. Instead, they will seek 
the help of system members deemed opinion leaders (Rogers, 2003). Opinion leaders are determined 
by their ability to repeatedly influence others' behavior in an informal manner. Opinion leaders have 
a number of traits relative to the rest of the system members: more exposure to external 
communication, higher socioeconomic status, great level of innovativeness (within system 
tolerances), and a position of influence in their interpersonal communication network. By serving as a 
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model of behavior imitation, they can be successful in leading the spread or rejection of an innovation 
(Rogers et al., 1995). 
An organization can also affect adoption of an innovation by its members. In a study of the 
adoption of computer technology for education use schools, Frank, Zhao, and Borman (2004) 
surveyed 60 teachers and determined social factors contributing to adoption and continued use. 
Because members were tied to a common fate by their organization, they would exert social pressure 
on each other. Teachers were also helped through the adoption process by access to help through 
those other organization members. 
When a news story breaks, certain media outlets often cover the story before others do. This 
hints at a social network across media sources with certain publications being opinion leaders and 
innovators of coverage and others taking lead from opinion leaders. This is the focus of the research 
in this study. 
Diffusion Criticisms 
The driving idea behind diffusion of innovation is typically that an innovation being studied 
should be diffused and that it should be adopted at a faster rate than may be already happening. 
These ideas are grouped into a criticism of diffusion of innovation research called the pro-innovation 
bias (Rogers, 2003). In most of the diffusion research summarized by Rogers, the innovations studied 
fit a generally positive definition of the term, such as solar power (Kaplan, 1999) and healthy 
behaviors (Singhal 8~ Rogers, 2003) (even when addressing negative issues such as stopping smoking 
to avoid health issues, Rogers, or boiling water for safer consumption, Wellin, 1955). In looking at 
positive innovations, the research is significantly focused on promoting the adoption of the 
innovation to all members of a system. Outside of Rogers own view of the cause of pro-innovation 
19 
bias, there are also positively-viewed innovation diffusion studies that have resulted in negative 
impacts on adopting populations. 
Indonesian government officials introduced more modern rice growing techniques that were 
very successful in other locations to Balinese farmers in the 1970s (Lansing, 1987). When these new 
methods where introduced in Balinese farming communities; displacing an indigenous system of 
farming collaboration where fields were grown in a particular order to conserve resources and limit 
pests; the result was a rapid increase in rat and insect populations, a decreasing in eel and fish 
populations, and decreased rice yields (Lansing). The adoption of innovations can have less 
devastating results, though still potentially negative. 
While Ryan and Gross (1943) looked at the successful adoption of hybrid seed corn, it also 
created a new farmer dependency on seed providers since produced crops, if replanted, would not 
have the same productive results. This removed prior self-sufficiency the farmer had in their own 
crop production. 
As well, Soule (1999) found that innovations can be diffused quite successfully even when 
they do not provide positive results. Even though the practice of student protest shantytowns 
diffused successfully to numerous campuses across the U.S., divestment in South Africa-related 
securities at those universities was actually slower than those without shantytown protests (Soule). 
Despite these criticisms, diffusion of innovation research still provides a solid framework for the 
analysis of media coverage of computer security issues. 
Research Questions 
Diffusion of innovation research covers the components of its definition: innovation, 
communication, time, and social system (Rogers, 2003). This study does the same by looking at 
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computer security threats as innovations, classifying communication content by knowledge type, 
measuring time lapses between and across topic coverage, and determining how computer security 
issues spread among media outlets. 
Roger's (2003} definition of innovation was something perceived to be new by the adopting 
unit. Using this definition, a newly discovered computer security threat would count as an 
innovation despite being less positive than many diffusion of innovation research subjects. From this 
innovation we can then analyze the communication surrounding computer security threats and how 
that information is presented. 
There are three knowledge classifications used to categorize information in diffusion of 
innovation research: awareness-knowledge, how-to knowledge, and principles-knowledge. These 
categories are used in this study as well, and they provide the first question concerning the 
presentation of computer security issues in the media. 
Research Question 1: What types of knowledge information about computer security issues are most 
commonly communicated in print media channels? 
Time has been researched in a number of methods in diffusion of innovation research. It has 
been done with respect to the end adopters: the lapse from first knowledge to adoption/rejection, the 
earliness of adoption compared to others system members, and the cumulative rate of adoption 
within a system. As well, diffusion channel research typically addresses what channels are used by 
adopters in the various decision stages. News diffusion research looks at time spans to initial 
awareness and the channels that facilitated it. 
This study, instead of looking at diffusion as a process that starts with an end consumer of a 
media source and proceeding from there, looks at diffusion time spans between first announcement 
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of a computer security threat in a media channel to when coverage of an issue is no longer being 
generated by media sources. First, though, that time span was established. 
Research Question 2.1: How much time do media sources spend covering a computer security threat 
as the primary subject of articles? 
During this span of time, the types of information communicated may be distributed in a 
reliable manner, leading to further time questions. 
Research Question 2.2: How is coverage of a computer security issue distributed over the course of its 
coverage time span established in RQ 2.1 ? 
Research Question 2.3: How many times does each media source cover the same computer security 
threat over the course of its coverage time span established in RQ 2.1? 
Research Question 2.4: Are certain types of knowledge information about computer security issues, 
established in RQ 1, more likely to occur during certain weeks of coverage (within the time span 
established in RQ 2.1)? 
Diffusion of innovation research on social system adoption is typically the measurement of 
time until adoption by system members. These time measurements are done in a number of ways 
such as the earliness of adoption compared to others system members and the cumulative rate of 
adoption within a system. This study looks at media sources as members of a social system, with the 
links between members established by the relative time between releases of news items. Using this 
social system, similar diffusion questions will be asked about how information moves throughout its 
members. 
Research Question 3: Which media sources fit into the diffusion of innovation adopter categories: 
innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards? 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
The diffusion research done in this study focuses on the channel content of computer security 
news coverage. While this study does not address audience acceptance and influence, it does provide 
a reflection of the potential audience exposure to computer security issues through media channels. 
In doing so, patterns of coverage were determined. To adequately research media coverage of 
computer security issues will require a large amount of archival data. 
Materials 
Archival data will be gathered from the LexisNexis index system to assess how five threats 
were covered by print and wire media sources (referred to as a print source throughout this study) 
based on diffusion of innovation criteria using online-based materials. 
LexisNexis is a "flagship service [providing] full-text documents from over 5,600 news, 
business, legal, medical, and reference publications with a variety of flexible search options" 
(LexisNexis, n.d.a). A single simple text search allows one to quickly check a collection of media 
sources spanning nearly three decades (LexisNexis, n.d.b). For instance, searches can be done on the 
full article text from "more than 350 newspapers", "more than 400 magazines and journals", and 
"transcripts from major television and radio networks, as well as political transcripts" (ibid). Many of 
the periodicals indexed by LexisNexis are often updated the day they are published. This study will 
be searching indexes of major newspaper articles, magazines and journal articles, and news wire 
reports. 
LexisNexis' major newspaper index source list includes major U.S. and global newspapers 
such as the New York Times, The Washington Post, USA Today, The Houston Chronicle, and 
numerous others. Search results from some sources were not included because of limitations of the 
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LexisNexis index. Some papers, while "major" when published, were no longer in circulation. Other 
papers were only indexed as of quite recently; those not in the index before 2001 were excluded. And 
still others were available only as a six-month rolling index, making searches of data from the time 
spans in this study impossible. 
Although LexisNexis archives 506 magazines and journals in its General News category, 
many of these did not show up in the resulting searches. None were excluded from the results, 
though, in case computer threats were covered in some of the narrowly-focused technical 
publications listed as sources in the index. As was the case with newspapers, some magazine and 
journal sources did not have indexed coverage for the entire research time spans. 
LexisNexis' wire reports are also quite extensive, covering 356 feeds. Many of these are also 
missing from any search results for this study given their subject coverage but were not excluded 
outright. Some wire report sources did not have indexed coverage for the entire research time spans 
as well. 
The potential reach, in terms of circulation numbers, for the sources searched in this study 
reaches well into the millions when added together. The U.S. major newspapers alone total over 
eleven million in circulation when summed. Although the circulation numbers from multiple 
periodicals cannot be assumed to be independent and would not necessarily represent the same 
population from year to year of archival material, with the expanse of news sources, the total 
circulation number would still be quite large. This extensive media reach was a major motivation for 
choosing the LexisNexis system. 
For this study, five threats were chosen based on a number of criteria. The particular research 
topic for this study is computer security issues, in this case malware. Malware is a portmanteau of the 
term "malicious software" that includes viruses, worms, and Trojan horses. Given the destructive 
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nature of this software, when malware affects typical home users, it often receives media coverage. 
This coverage could range from an analysis of the vulnerability or an explanation of the solution to a 
simple warning to consumers. This study, though, does not look at media content in a qualitative 
manner such as framing or media bias. Instead the coverage a particular issue receives was classified 
and compared across media sources. 
Malware threats are typically given unique names, making them ideal for index searches. The 
threats chosen for this study were selected from a timeline of notable threats (Wikipedia, 2005). Prior 
to 1999, most computer threat infection rates were measured in weeks and months. The Melissa virus 
was released in March of 1999 and spread to hundreds of thousands of computers in hours (Schultz, 
2006). In order to compare similar items, threats were chosen that utilized the interconnectedness of 
computers, either through the Internet, through local network typologies, or through e-mail. From 
those remaining, Melissa, ILOVEYOU, Code Red, Nimda, Klez, SQL Slammer, Blaster, Welchia, 
Sobig, Mydoom, Sasser, and Zotob were picked. The threats named Sober and Witty were not picked 
because of the likelihood of finding them mentioned outside of computer security coverage. As well, 
the threat named Santy was not picked because it targeted PHP (a type of programming language) 
web servers and did not threaten most home users. A description of a number of famous computer 
security threats can be found in the appendix, the twelve above as well as some that were not 
researched. 
The threats analyzed in this research were Nimda, Klez, SQLSlammer, Sobig, and Zotob. 
Nimda attack vectors are vulnerable web servers, through an exploit in Microsoft Internet 
Information Services, and through e-mail attachments sent to addresses harvested from infected 
machines. Klez spreads primarily through e-mail as an attachment, launching when previewed in 
unpatched e-mail applications or through users executing the attached files, but can also duplicate 
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itself through a network connection to local and remote drives. SQLSlammer does not spread 
through e-mail, but attacks from a host as a single network transmission packet sent to as many 
potential future victims as quickly as possible. Sobig spreads primarily through e-mail attachment 
infection, though it also contained anetwork-capable spreading mechanism, but it also contained 
code to allow infected machines to connect to remote systems for future potential updates or attack 
spreading mechanisms Finally, Zotob spreads through network transmissions that attacked a 
vulnerability in the Plug-and-Play service of unsecured Microsoft Windows systems, requiring no 
user interaction and placing aremotely-accessible back door on infected machines. 
Procedures 
The research questions for this study are answered using the following procedures. All 
threats were used as search terms in the LexisNexis index system. The returned search results became 
the archival data used for analysis. 
Procedures for Research Question 1 
Research Question 1: What types of knowledge information about computer security issues are most 
commonly communicated in print media channels? 
To determine what knowledge information is presented about computer security issues is to 
do a content analysis of the desired news stories. To answer this research question, search results 
from LexisNexis queries were classified by the knowledge type they present in their copy. Articles 
were classified by the knowledge categories from Rogers (2003): awareness-knowledge, how-to 
knowledge, principles-knowledge based on the definitions provided by Rogers. Simply being a 
search result item with the desired term likely results in a classification of awareness knowledge. 
Articles that then describe the availability of a vulnerability patch or behavior that would prevent or 
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stop attacks elevates the article to how-to knowledge. Lastly, any articles that describe the inner 
workings of a threat, such as how it infects a system or spreads to other systems, presents principles-
knowledge. 
The unit of analysis for this research question was articles from newspapers, magazines and 
journals, and wire services. Once articles from these sources were classified, frequency analysis was 
used to determine the amount of coverage each knowledge type receives for each computer security 
threat. After all threats were analyzed individually, the amount of coverage each knowledge type 
received across all threats was analyzed through frequency analysis as well. 
Procedures for Research Question 2 
Research Question 2.1: How much time do media sources spend covering a computer security threat 
as the primary subject of articles? 
An analysis of the archival materials publication dates results in the time span for each threat. 
In this study, the end point was determined to be the entire course of coverage for a computer 
security threat, from the earliest article publication date to the last article publication date. All search 
results will be considered a part of the time span unless they only mention the threat search term in 
passing and not as a primary theme or all use of the threat term is worded in the past tense; this 
allowed the exclusion of articles that simply make reference to previous threats without providing 
any further information as well as articles that describe threats as a problem that no longer exists. 
The unit of analysis for this research question was articles from newspapers, magazines and 
journals, and wire services. LexisNexis search results for computer security terms include publication 
dates. For each computer security threat, the first article mentioning a threat was marked as the 
starting point and the final mention (as described above) was marked as the ending point of 
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coverage. Finding the arithmetic difference between these two dates provided the number of days of 
coverage a computer security threat received. After all time spans have been determined, they were 
compared across all threats to determine how much coverage computer security threats typically 
receive. 
Research Question 2.2: How is coverage of a computer security issue distributed over the course of its 
coverage time span established in RQ 2.1? 
Using the time span for a specific threat determined in Research Question 2.1, an analysis of 
the amount of coverage a computer security threat receives each day was done to determine the 
distribution of coverage. 
The unit of analysis for this research question was articles from newspapers, magazines and 
journals, and wire services. A frequency analysis was done by grouping all articles published on the 
same day, broken down by the source (newspaper, magazine/journal, or wire service). 
Research Question 2.3: How many times does each media source cover the same computer security 
threat over the course of its coverage time span established in RQ 2.1? 
Again, using the time span for a specific threat determined in Research Question 2.1, an 
analysis was done on the amount of coverage a single media source provides on a single threat. 
The unit of analysis for this research question was articles from newspapers, magazines and 
t~ 
journals, and wire services. The results from the LexisNexis searches were grouped by publication 
source and a frequency analysis was then be done to show which sources cover a single issue the 
most. 
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Research Question 2.4: Are certain types of knowledge information about computer security issues, 
established in RQ 1, more likely to occur at the during certain weeks of coverage (within the time 
span established in RQ 2.1)? 
Using both the time span from Research Question 2.1 and the categorization of articles by 
knowledge type from Research Question 1, an analysis was then done to determine how knowledge 
types are represented over the course of computer security threat media coverage. 
The unit of analysis for this research question was articles from newspapers, magazines and 
journals, and wire services. A frequency analysis was done by grouping all articles published within 
the same week (up to the point that 95 percent of threat coverage has been reached), similar to 
Research Question 2.2 but grouped by the knowledge type the article received in Research Question 
1. These weeks were then plotted based on their percentages for that week to determine if earlier or 
later weeks offer more of different knowledge level articles. 
Procedures for Research Question 3 
Research Question 3: Which media sources fit into the diffusion of innovation adopter categories: 
innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards? 
Since news articles rarely cite other news articles as sources, determining who adopted a 
story first requires the use of a time element; the relative publication date between unique media 
sources. This research question analyzes which media sources fit into the adopter categories 
described in diffusion of innovation research. A media source was considered an earlier "adopter" of 
a specific computer security issue if it is published before another article. 
The unit of analysis for this research question was articles from newspapers, magazines and 
journals, and wire services. From the collection of all non-excluded (as determined above) search 
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results from LexisNexis, the first article from each source was chosen. By dividing up the 
chronological list of those articles into the percentages used to segregate adopter categories (2.5 
percent for innovators, 13.5 percent for early adopters, 34 percent for early majority, 34 percent for 
late majority, and 16 percent for laggards), the sources were marked as their appropriate adopter 
category for each computer security threat. For each time a source is found to be in a specific 
category, it was given a weighted value (innovator being five, laggard being one, and zero if not in 
the result set). Once all threats were analyzed, sources had their scores averaged to determine their 
overall adopter category. 
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
This study was conducted to analyze the coverage that computer security threats receive 
from mass print media publications. This analysis was needed to start to understand how much 
coverage a threat can receive and how soon after discovery it is covered, what level of information is 
presented to readers, and what sources are the best for finding computer security threat information 
the earliest. 
Sample 
Articles were found for all five computer security threats through searches on the LexisNexis 
index system. The primary name used to describe the chosen threats was used as a search term for a 
news search, using the "all available dates" date range, in all of the following categories: "general 
news, major newspapers," "general news, magazines &journals," and "news wires, all available wire 
reports." 
After elimination for passing references to the search term or referring to the search term 
entirely in past tense, there were 902 remaining articles (161 for Klez, 327 for Nimda, 248 for Sobig, 69 
for SQL Slammer, and 97 for Zotob). 
Threat 1-Nimda 
Nimda's biggest attack was its ability to spread through vulnerable web servers through an 
exploit in Microsoft Internet Information Services that would allow it to modify existing HTML files 
to offer Nimda-infected files for download to visitors of that site. Alternatively, Nimda spread 
through e-mail attachments sent to addresses harvested from infected machines. 
Research Question 1-Nimda: What types of knowledge information about computer security 
issues are most commonly communicated in print media channels? 
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Coverage of knowledge types is equal when all media outlets are taken collectively: 
awareness- (38 percent), how-to (34 percent), and principles-knowledge (28 percent) when addressing 
the Nimda security threat. When taken individually, wire reports and magazines reflect this equal 
distribution. Newspapers, though, covered Nimda with twice as many awareness-knowledge (48 
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Figure 4. RQ 1: Nimda -Knowledge Type Coverage (Magazines 8~ Journals) 
Research Question 2.1-Nimda: How much time do media sources spend covering a computer 
security threat as the primary subject of articles? 
Print media coverage of the Nimda computer security threat began September 18th, 2001 in 
newspapers, wire services, and magazine outlets. The beginning of coverage coincided with the day 
the threat was first noted (Tocheva et al., 2001), though it was eleven months after a patch was first 
made available (Microsoft Corp., 2000). Coverage lasted 365 days, with current magazine and journal 
coverage stopping after 83 days (23 percent of the entire time span) and wire reports coverage 
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Figure 5. RQ 2.1: Nimda -Coverage Span by Media Type 
Research Question ~.2 -Nimda: How is coverage of a computer security issue distributed over the 
course of its coverage time span established in RQ 2.1? 
Although current articles about the Nimda computer security threat showed up 365 days 
after initial coverage, 80 percent of the coverage showed up within the first ten days (95 percent 
within 51 days). Individually, after the first ten days of coverage, newspaper coverage reached 82 
percent (over 95 percent in 52 days), wire reports reached 86 percent (95 percent in 51 days), and 
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Figure 7. RQ 2.2: Nimda -Individual Coverage by Media Type Over Time 
Research Question 2.3 - Nimda: How many times does each media source cover the same computer 
security threat over the course of its coverage time span established in RQ 2.1? 
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Although the Nimda computer security threat was covered in 327 articles, only 103 sources 
were involved. Of these 103 sources, 18 covered Nimda with four or more articles; 19 sources 
published three articles, 22 published two articles, and 44 published one article. Of these sources 49 
were newspapers, 38 were wire services, and 16 were magazines. The 49 newspaper sources were 
responsible for 91 articles. The 38 wire services produced 211 articles. And the 16 magazines and 
journals published 25 articles. Essentially, in the case of the wire services, 37 percent of the sources 
produced 65 percent of the total Nimda articles (48 percent:28 percent for newspapers, and 16 
percent:eight percent for magazines and journals). 
Of the top 18 repeat sources of Nimda coverage, only one was a magazine (Information 
Security) and only one was a newspaper (The San Francisco Chronicle). The remaining top 18 were 
wire services. 
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Research Question 2.4 -Nimda: Are certain types of knowledge information about computer 
security issues, established in RQ 1, more likely to occur during certain weeks of coverage (within 
the time span established in RQ 2.1)? 
Initial coverage of the Nimda threat was fairly evenly distributed (36, 30, and 34 percent). As 
the weeks progressed, a shift in coverage left relatively fewer (as a percentage of the weeks coverage) 
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Research Question 3 -Nimda: Which media sources fit into the diffusion of innovation adopter 
categories: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards? 
After sorting the sources that covered the Nimda computer security threat by first article 
date, the innovator category percentages created the following number of category members: three 
innovators, 14 early adopters, 35 in early majority, 35 in late majority, and 16 laggards. Of these 
38 
categories, membership in these categories was as follows: innovator category — a11(3) wire servies; 
early adopters —one newspaper, 13 wire services; early majority —18 newspapers, 16 wire services, 
and one magazine/journal; late majority — 25 newspapers, six magazines/journals, and four wire 
services; and laggards —five newspapers, nine magazines/journals, and one wire service. 
Table 1. RQ 3: Nimda -Adopter Categories 
*N=Newspaper, W=Wire, M=Magazine/Journal 
Innovators (2.5%) Early Majority (34%) Late Majority (34%) Laggards (16%) 
AFX European Focus (W) AAP NEWSFEED (W) Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio) (N) Omaha World Herald (Nebraska) (N) 
Agence France Presse -- English (W) Buffalo News (New York) (N) Rocky Mountain News (Denver, CO) (N) Electronics News (Australia) (M) 
Associated Press (W) Business Newswire (W) Singapore News (N) Factory Equipment News (Australia) (M) 
Columbus Dispatch (Ohio) (N) South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) (N) Tele.Com (M) 
Duetsche Presse-Agentur (W) The Australian (N) The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo) (N) 
Early Adopters (13.5%) Financial Times (London, England) (N) The Boston Herald (N) Times-Picayune (New Orleans, LA) (N) 
Associated Press Online (W) Herald Sun (Melbourne, Australia) (N) The Dominion (Wellington) (N) Library Journal (M) 
Associated Press State &Local Wire (W) Jiji Press Ticker Service (W) The Evening Post (Wellington) (N) Direct (M) 
Associated Press Worldstream (W) M2 PRESSWIRE (W) The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec) (N) Information Security (M) 
Business Wire (W) Malaysia General News (W) The Irish Times (N) School Library Journal (M) 
Canadian Corporate Newswire (W) Milwaukee Journal Sentinel (Wisconsin) (N) The Nelson Mail (New Sealand) (N) The New York Times (N) 
Cox News service (W) Newswire (VNU) (W) The New Zealand Herald (N) Editor and Publisher Magazine (M) 
Deutsche Presse-Agentur (W) ONASA News Agency (W) The Oregonian (N) St. Petersburg Times (Florida) (N) 
Internet Wire (W) OTS Originaltextservice (W) The Ottawa Citizen (N) Canada Newswire (W) 
Japan Economic Newswire (W) Pittsbrugh Post-Gazette (Pennsylvania) (N) The Scotsman (N) What PC (M) 
Newsbytes (W) Press Association (W) The Seattle Times (N) 
PR Newswire (W) Scripps Howard News Service (W) The Straits Times (Singapore) (N) 
The San Francisco Chronicle (N) The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (N) The Advertiser (N) 
United Press International (W) The Bulletin's Frontrunner (W) The Houston Chronicle (N) 
XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE (W) The Daily Telegraph (Sydney, Australia) (N) Courier Mail (Queensland, Australia) (N) 
The Guardian (London) (N) Bahrain Tribune (W) 
The Herald (Glasgow) (N) Computer Reseller News (M) 
The Industry Standard.com (M) Information Week (M) 
The Miami Herald (N) Infotech Weekly (M) 
The San Diego Union-Tribune (N) NZ Infotech Weekly (Wellington) (M) 
The Washington Post (N) Tampa Tribune (Florida) (N) 
Toronto Star (N) The Press (Christchurch) (N) 
Wall Street Journal (N) VNU NET (M) 
Asahi News Service (W) Middle East Company News Wire (W) 
Asia Pulse (W) CBNet (W) 
City News Service (W) Network News (W) 
Hobart Mercury (Australia) (N) USA TODAY (N) 
New Straits Times (Malaysia) (N) The Press (Chirstchurch) (N) 
New Zealand Press Association (W) ComputerWire (M) 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Pennsylvania) (N) THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON) (N) 
Threat 2 - Klez 
Klez spread primarily through e-mail as an attachment. This attachment had the potential to 
launch when previewed in unpatched e-mail applications but would also spread through users 
executing the attached files. Klez also contained anetwork-capable spreading capability that would 
look for local and remote drives and copy itself to these locations to be potentially executed by the 
newly infected users. 
Research Question 1- Klez: What types of knowledge information about computer security issues 
are most commonly communicated in print media channels? 
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Coverage of knowledge types leans toward awareness- and how-to knowledge when all 
media outlets are taken collectively: awareness- (48 percent), how-to (41 percent), and principles-
knowledge (17 percent) when addressing the Klez security threat. When taken individually, 
newspaper coverage was half how-to knowledge with principles- and awareness-knowledge splitting 
the other half (23 percent and 28 percent respectively), wire service coverage was half awareness-
knowledge with how-to and principles-knowledge splitting the other half almost 70/30 (35 percent 
and 14 percent respectively), and magazines offered no principles-knowledge articles with 
awareness-knowledge consisting of 38 percent and how-to knowledge consisting of 62 percent. 
Principles-Knowledge, 17% 
Awareness-Knowledge, 48% 
How-to Knowledge, 41 
Figure 10. RQ 1: Klez -Knowledge Type Coverage 
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Principles-Knowledge, 28% 
How-to Knowledge, 49% 
Awareness Knowledge, 23% 
Figure 11. RQ 1: Klez -Knowledge Type Coverage (Newspapers) 
Principles-Knowledge, 14% 
Awareness Knowledge, 51 
How-to Knowledge, 35% 
Figure 12. RQ 1: Klez -Knowledge Type Coverage (Wire Services) 
41 
Awareness Knowledge, 38% 
How-to Knowledge, 62% 
Figure 13. RQ 1: Klez -Knowledge Type Coverage (Magazines 8~ Journals) 
Research Question 2.1- Klez: How much time do media sources spend covering a computer 
security threat as the primary subject of articles? 
Print media coverage of the Klez computer security threat began February 01, 2002 in 
newspapers; magazines started March 06, 2002 and wire services started Apri122, 2002. The 
beginning of coverage began 98 days after the threat was first noted (F-Secure Anti-Virus Research 
Team, 2001) and ten months (309 days) after instructions for protection were first made available 
(Microsoft Corp., 2001). Coverage lasted 567 days, with current newspaper coverage lasting the full 
span, magazine and journal coverage stopping after 461 days (81 percent of the entire time span), and 
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Figure 14.2.1: Klez -Coverage Span by Media Type 
21-Oct-02 29-Jan-03 9-May-03 17-Aug-03 
Research Question 2.2 - Klez: How is coverage of a computer security issue distributed over the 
course of its coverage time span established in RQ 2.1? 
Unlike the initial thrust of coverage shown in the Nimda threat, taken collectively, articles 
about the Klez computer security threat showed up more steadily across the 567 days of coverage, 
though a less vertical spike did occur between 80 and 150 days. Individually, media types were 
similar to overall coverage. Newspapers and wire services spiked the earliest. Newspapers spiked the 
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Figure 16. RQ 2.2: Klez -Individual Coverage by Media Type Over Time 
Research Question 2.3 - Nimda: How many times does each media source cover the same computer 
security threat over the course of its coverage time span established in RQ 2.1? 
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Although the Klez computer security threat was covered in 161 articles, only 63 sources were 
involved. Of these 63 sources, 10 covered Klez with four or more articles; three sources published 
three articles, 12 published two articles, and 38 published one article. Of these sources 28 were 
newspapers, 30 were wire services, and eight were magazines. The 28 newspaper sources were 
responsible for 47 articles. The 30 wire services produced 101 articles. And the eight magazines and 
journals published 13 articles. In the case of the wire services, 45 percent of the sources produced 63 
percent of the total Klez articles (42 percent:29 percent for newspapers, and 12 percent:8 percent for 
magazines and journals). 
Of the top ten repeat sources of Klez coverage, all but three wire services; the remaining were 
newspaper sources (South China Morning Post, The Houston Chronicle, and The New Zealand 
Herald). 
Others (1 each), 37 
The Australian, 2 
Tampa Tribune (Florida), 2 
Plain Dealer (Cleveland, 
Ohio), 2 
Newhouse News Service, 2 
Japan Economic Newswire, 2~\ 
Information Security, 2 
Computing, 2~ // 
Computer Reseller News, 2 
Columbus Dispatch (Ohio), 2 
Associated Press 
Worldstream, 2 
Associated Press Online, 2 
The Press (Christchurch, 
New Zealand), 3 
The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), 3 
M2 Presswire, 18 
Newswire (VNU), 16 
Business Wire, 10 
Canada Newswire, 10 
PR Newswire, 10 
~ Newsbytes, 7 
South China Morning Post 
(Hong Kong), 7 
—Asia Pulse, 4 
The Houston Chronicle, 4 
The New Zealand Herald, 4 
Network Computing, 3-~ Internet Wire, 3 





® PR Newswire 
N ews bytes 
South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) 
Asia Pulse 
■The Houston Chronicle 
The New Zealand Herald 
Internet Wire 
Network Computing 
®The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo) 
®The Press (Christchurch, New Zealand) 
®Associated Press Online 
■Associated Press Worldstream 
Columbus Dispatch (Ohio) 
Computer Reseller News 
Computing 
Information Security 
Japan Economic Newswire 
Newhouse News Service 
Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio) 
Tampa Tribune (Florida) 
The Australian 
Others (1 each) 
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Research Question 2.4 - Klez: Are certain types of knowledge information about computer security 
issues, established in RQ 1, more likely to occur during certain weeks of coverage (within the time 
span established in RQ 2.1)? 
Given the spread-out nature of the coverage of the Klez computer security threat, a pattern of 
knowledge type coverage was not apparent. Many weeks of coverage consisted of only one article. 
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Research Question 3 - Klez: Which media sources fit into the diffusion of innovation adopter 
categories: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards? 
After sorting the sources that covered the Klez computer security threat by first article date, 
the innovator category percentages created the following number of category members: two 
innovators, eight early adopters, 21 in early majority, 21 in late majority, and ten laggards. Of these 
46 
categories, membership in these categories was as follows: innovator category —all (2) wire services; 
early adopters —three newspaper, five wire services; early majority —eleven newspapers, nine wire 
services, and one magazine/journal; late majority —ten newspapers, five magazines/journals, and six 
wire services; and laggards —three newspapers, five magazines/journals, and two wire service. 
Table 2. RQ 3: Klez -Adopter Categories 
*N=Newspaper, W=Wire, M=Magazine/Journal 
Innovators (2.5%) Early Majority (34%) 
Canada Newswire (W) South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) (N) 
Business Wire (W) The Business Times Singapore (N) 
The San Diego Union-Tribune (N) 
The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo) (N) 
Early Adopters (13.5%) Japan Economic Newswire (W) 
PR Newswire (W) Associated Press Worldstream (W) 
M2 Presswire (W) Internet Wire (W) 
Newsbytes (W) XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE (W) 
CanadianCorporate Newswire (W) CTK Business News Wire (W) 
Newswire (VNU) (W) Central News Agency -Taiwan (W) 
Columbus Dispatch (Ohio) (N) Asia Pulse (W) 
The Houston Chronicle (N) RIA Novosti (W) 
Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio) (N) Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN) (N) 
Computimes (Malaysia) (M) 
The Straits Times (Singapore) (N) 
The Guardian (London) (N) 
Press Association (W) 
The Advertiser (N) 
The New York Times (N) 
The Observer(N) 
Sunday Mail (Queensland, Australia) (N) 
Late Majority (34%) 
Sunday Herald Sun (Melbourne, Australia) (N) 
Newhouse News Service (W) 
Electronics News (Australia) (M) 
The Seattle Times (N) 
The New Zealand Herald (N) 
The Press (Christchurch, New Zealand) (N) 
San Antonio Express-News (Texas) (N) 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Pennsylvania) (N) 
Cox News Service (W) 
Tampa Tribune (Florida) (N) 
The Australian (N) 
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (N) 
Associated Press (W) 
Associated Press Online (W) 
Deutsche Presse-Agentur (W) 
Agence France Presse -- English (W) 
Network Computing (M) 
Herald Sun (Melbourne, Australia) (N) 
Computing (M) 
Computer Reseller News (M) 
Network News (M) 
Threat 3 -SQLSlammer 
Laggards (16%) 
Information Security (M) 
The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec) (N) 
new.architect (M) 
The Toronto Sun (N) 
Jiji Press Ticker Service (W) 
New Straits Times-Management Times (W) 
Information Systems Auditor (W) 
Gannett News Service (W) 
USA TODAY (N) 
Iran News Agency (W) 
Unlike a majority of computer security threats, SQLSlammer did not spread through e-mail. 
Although it primarily targeted business servers running the Microsoft SQL Server 2000 database 
system, it could also infect home users through the Microsoft Data Engine (MSDE) 2000 consumer-
level database system (included with a number of commercial software products). This threat 
required no user intervention to successfully attack a system since it was sent as a single transmission 
packet. Once infected, a system would attempt further infections as quickly as it can send out the 
single packet threats. 
Research Question 1-SQLSlammer: What types of knowledge information about computer 
security issues are most commonly communicated in print media channels? 
Coverage of knowledge types for the SQLSlammer computer security threat leans toward 
how-to knowledge when all media outlets are taken collectively: awareness- (17 percent), how-to (70 
47 
percent), and principles-knowledge (13 percent). When taken individually, newspaper coverage 
excluded principles-knowledge and was mostly how-to knowledge (61 percent), with the remaining 
being awareness-knowledge (39 percent). Wire service coverage was mostly how-to knowledge (70 
percent) with awareness- and principles-knowledge splitting the other quarter (eleven percent and 19 
percent respectively). Magazines and journals offered a similar picture to wire services (79 percent 
how-to knowledge, seven percent awareness-knowledge, and 14 percent principles-knowledge). 
Principles-Knowledge, 13% 
How-to Knowledge, 70% 
Awareness-Knowledge, 17% 
Figure 19. RQ 1: SQIL Slammer -Knowledge Type Coverage 
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Awareness-Knowledge, 39% 
How-to Knowledge, 61 
Figure 20. RQ 1: SQIL Slammer -Knowledge Type Coverage (Newspapers) 
Principles-Knowledge, 19% 
Awareness-Knowledge, 11 
How-to Knowledge, 70% 




How-to Knowledge, 79% 
Figure 22. RQ 1: SQL Slammer -Knowledge Type Coverage (Magazines &Journals) 
Research Question 2.1-SQLSlammer: How much time do media sources spend covering a 
computer security threat as the primary subject of articles? 
Print media coverage of the SQLSlammer computer security threat began January 25, 2003 in 
wire services; newspapers started January 26, 2003 and magazines/journals started January 28, 2003. 
The beginning of coverage coincided with the day the threat was first noted (Hyppopen 8~ Erdelyi, 
2003) and six months (185 days) after a security patch was first made available (Microsoft Corp., 
2002a). Coverage lasted 144 days, with current wire service coverage lasting the full span, newspaper 
coverage started one day later than wire services and lasted only eleven days (8 percent of the entire 
time span), and magazine and journal coverage started three days after wire services and lasted 32 
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Figure 23. RQ 2.1: SQLSlammer -Coverage Span by Media Type 
Research Question 2.2 -SQLSlammer: How is coverage of a computer security issue distributed 
over the course of its coverage time span established in RQ 2.1? 
Similar to the initial thrust of coverage shown in the Nimda threat, taken collectively, articles 
about the SQLSlammer computer security threat lasted 144 days but had spiked to 95 percent within 
23 days. Individually, newspapers spiked quicker, reaching just under 95 percent in nine days. Wire 
services were slower to spike, taking 35 days to pass 95 percent. Lastly, magazines and journal 
coverage spiked to 95 percent after 23 days. All current coverage stopped for 109 days after day 35 of 
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Figure 25. RQ 2.2: SQLSlammer -Individual Coverage by Media Type Over Time 
Research Question 2.3 -SQLSlammer: How many times does each media source cover the same 
computer security threat over the course of its coverage time span established in RQ 2.1? 
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Although the SQLSlammer computer security threat was covered in 144 articles, only 41 
sources were involved. Of these 41 sources, three covered SQLSlammer with four or more articles; 
four sources published three articles, five published two articles, and 29 published one article. Of 
these sources 15 were newspapers, 18 were wire services, and eight were magazines. These sources 
were responsible for roughly their share of the articles: the 37 percent newspaper sources produced 
26 percent of the articles, the 44 percent wire service sources produced 54 percent of the articles, and 
the 20 percent magazine/journal sources produced 20 percent of the articles. 
Of the top twelve repeat sources of SQLSlammer coverage, half were wire services; the 
remaining were four magazines/journals (Computer Weekly, eweek, Computimes, and VNU NET) 
and two newspaper (South China Morning Post and Hobart Mercury). 
Others (1 each), 29 
VNU NET, 2-~ 
M2 Presswire, 2 
Internet Wire, 2 
PR Newswire, 8 
Business Wire, 6 
Newswire (VNU), 4 
` Agence France Presse --
English, 3 
Computer Weekly, 3 
~-eweek, 3 
South China Morning Post 
(Hong Kong), 3 
Computimes (Malaysia), 2 
Hobart Mercury (Australia), 2 
Figure 26. RQ 2.3: SQLSlammer -Coverage Amount by Source 
:~ PR Newswire 
■Business Wire 
Newswire (VNU) 
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■Computer Weekly 
~~~~ eweek 
■South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) 
Computimes (Malaysia) 




■Others (1 each) 
53 
Research Question 2.4 -SQLSlammer: Are certain types of knowledge information about 
computer security issues, established in RQ 1, more likely to occur during certain weeks of 
coverage (within the time span established in RQ 2.1)? 
Coverage of the SQLSlammer security threat was weighted toward how-to knowledge 
overall and this is reflected in the weekly breakdowns of knowledge type coverage. The first week is 
65 percent how-to. The second week is 88 percent how-to and the remaining weeks up to 95 percent 
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Research Question 3 -SQLSlammer: Which media sources fit into the diffusion of innovation 
adopter categories: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards? 
After sorting the sources that covered the SQLSlammer computer security threat by first 
article date, the innovator category percentages created the following number of category members: 
one innovators, six early adopters, 14 in early majority, 14 in late majority, and seven laggards. Of 
54 
these categories, membership in these categories was as follows: innovator category —one wire 
service; early adopters —two newspaper and four wire services; early majority —six newspapers and 
eight wire services; late majority —seven newspapers, four wire services, and three 
magazines/journals; and laggards —one wire service and one wire service. 
Table 3 . RQ 3: SQLSlammer -Adopter Categories 
*IV=Newspaper, W=Wire, M=Magazine/Journal 
Innovators (2.5%) Early Majority (34%) 
PR Newswire (W) Financial Times (London, England) (N) 
The Daily Telegraph (Sydney, Australia) (N) 
Agence France Presse -- English (W) 
Early Adopters (13.5%) USA Today (N) 
Business Wire (W) Toronto Star (N) 
Canada Newswire (W) South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) (N) 
The Observer (N) Herald Sun (Melbourne, Australia) (N) 
PR Newswire Europe (W) Newswire (VNU) (W) 
AFX European Focus (W) M2 Presswire (W) 
The Independent (London) (N) Associated Press Online (W) 
Associated Press State &Local Wire (W) 
Associated Press (W) 
AFX -Asia (W) 
Asia Pulse (W) 
Late Majority (34%) 
Hobart Mercury (Australia) (N) 
The Advertiser (N) 
Japan Economic Newswire (W) 
Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN) (N) 
San Antonio Express-News (Texas) (N) 
The New York Times (N) 
Taiwan Economic News (M) 
Internet Wire (W) 
The Houston Chronicle (N) 
Computer Weekly (M) 
Malaysia Economic News (W) 
The Press (Christchurch) (N) 
Computimes (Malaysia) (M) 
New Straits Times-Management Times (W) 
Threat 4 -Sobig 
Laggards (16%) 
The Economist (M) 
eWeek (M) 
Computer Reseller News (M) 
VNU NET (M) 
Middle East Company News Wire (W) 
Chain Store Age Executive with Shopping Center Age (M) 
Sobig spreads primarily through e-mail attachment infection but also contained anetwork-
capable spreading mechanism. One of the biggest dangers to Sobig was a preprogrammed setting 
that would instruct infected machines to connect to remote systems for future potential updates or 
attack spreading mechanisms (this remote connection was actually blocked by the combined efforts 
of security professionals and US officials when it was determined what sites would be contacted so 
its true potential was never fully revealed). 
Research Question 1-Sobig: What types of knowledge information about computer security 
issues are most commonly communicated in print media channels? 
Coverage of knowledge types for the Sobig computer security threat leans toward 
awareness-knowledge and how-to knowledge when all media outlets are taken collectively: 
awareness- (42 percent), how-to (43 percent), and principles-knowledge (15 percent). When taken 
individually, newspaper coverage reflects this coverage almost identically (48, 40, and 12 percent 
55 
respectively). Wire service coverage was half how-to knowledge (50 percent) with awareness- and 
principles-knowledge splitting the other half (36 percent and 14 percent respectively). Magazines and 
journals offered similar proportions of knowledge type coverage to that of wire services except the 
majority was awareness-knowledge (52 percent awareness knowledge, 15 percent how-to knowledge, 
and 33 percent principles-knowledge). 
Principles-Knowledge, 15% 
Awareness-Knowledge, 42% 
How-to Knowledge, 43% 










How-to Knowledge, 4 
Awareness-Knowledge, 48% 
Figure 29. RQ 1: SQL Slammer -Knowledge Type Coverage (Newspapers) 
Principles-Knowledge, 14% 
Awareness-Knowledge, 36% 
How-to Knowledge, 50% 





Figure 31. RQ 1: SQL Slammer -Knowledge Type Coverage (Magazines &Journals) 
Research Question 2.1-Sobig: How much time do media sources spend covering a computer 
security threat as the primary subject of articles? 
Print media coverage of the Sobig computer security threat began January 10, 2003 in wire 
services; newspapers started January 15, 2003 and magazines/journals started January 20, 2003. The 
beginning of coverage coincided with one day after the threat was first noted (Erdelyi, 2003). Unlike 
other threats covered in this study, protective measures were made available after the threat was first 
discovered. The Sobig threat was first noted January 09, 2003 (Erdelyi, 2003) and the security bulletin 
was posted August 20, 2003 (Microsoft Corp., 2002b), more than seven months later (223 days). 
Coverage lasted 295 days, with current wire service coverage starting on the beginning day and 
lasting 250 days (85 percent of the entire time span), newspaper coverage started five days later than 
wire services and lasted 280 days (95 percent), and magazine and journal coverage started ten days 
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figure 32. RQ 2.1: Sobig -Coverage Span by Media Type 
18-Jul-03 6-Sep-03 26-Oct-03 
Research Question 2.2 -Sobig: How is coverage of a computer security issue distributed over the 
course of its coverage time span established in RQ 2.1? 
Sobig threat coverage is unique compared to threats analyzed so far. Coverage started off 
slow for 224 days, with a 79 day span without an article. After the 224th day, though, coverage spiked 
as it had in the beginning of Nimda and SQLSlammer coverage. The Microsoft security bulletin about 
Sobig was released 223 days after coverage began, just prior to this spike. Coverage then rose from 28 
percent on day 222 to 95 percent on day 232 (67 percent increase in ten days). Individually, 
newspapers spiked quicker, rising from 16 percent on day 222 to 96 percent on day 228 (80 percent 
increase in six days). Wire services spiked similarly but started at 37 percent coverage and reaching 
95 percent in six days. Lastly, magazines and journal coverage spiked the slowest, taking 19 days to 
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Figure 34. RQ 2.2: Sobig -Individual Coverage by Media Type Over Time 
Research Question 2.3 -Sobig: How many times does each media source cover the same computer 
security threat over the course of its coverage time span established in RQ 2.1? 
60 
The Sobig computer security threat was covered in 248 articles by 94 sources. Of these 94 
sources, 16 covered Sobig with four or more articles; seven sources published three articles, 28 
published two articles, and 43 published one article. Of these sources 48 were newspapers (51 percent 
of sources), 29 were wire services (31 percent), and 17 were magazines/journals (18 percent). The 51 
percent newspaper sources produced 90 articles (36 percent of all coverage), the 31 percent wire 
service sources produced 131 articles (53 percent), and the 18 percent magazines/journal articles 
produced 27 articles (eleven percent). 
Of the top 16 repeat sources of Sobig coverage, twelve were wire services; the remaining 
were three newspapers (The Houston Chronicle, The Gazette, and The New York Times) and one 
magazine/journal (Computer Reseller News). 
Others (1 each), 42 
Others (2 each), 56 
The Independent (London), 3 
The Guardian (London), 3J~ 
The Boston Globe, 3 
Press Association, 3-
eWeek, 3 
Columbus Dispatch (Ohio), 3—
Chicago Sun-Tribune, 3—
The New York Times, 4 
r Business Wire, 17 
M2 Presswire, 14 
PR Newswire, 12 
~ Newsbytes, 9 
Agence France Presse --
English, 8 
—Newswire (VNU), 8 
The Houston Chronicle, 8 
~--Associated Press, 7 
Associated Press State & 
Local Wire, 7 
Associated Press 
Worldstream, 7 
United Press International, 7 
Associated Press Online, 6 
Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 5 
Computer Reseller News, 6 
The Gazette (Montreal, 
Quebec), 4 
Figure 35. RQ 2.3: Sobig -Coverage Amount by Source 
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Research Question 2.4 -Sobig: Are certain types of knowledge information about computer 
security issues, established in RQ 1, more likely to occur during certain weeks of coverage (within 
the time span established in RQ 2.1)? 
Coverage of the Sobig security threat was weighted toward awareness- and how-to 
knowledge overall but the weeks leading up to the spike in coverage were split similarly with the 
weight being how-to (41 percent) and principles-knowledge (33 percent), with awareness-knowledge 
at 26 percent. After the coverage spike, the knowledge coverage better reflects the overall proportions 
of awareness- and how-to knowledge receiving the most coverage (awareness-knowledge: 45 













~ ~ ~ '\ ~ '~ ~ ~ 'l ~ ~~ rye ti~ ~1 ~~ ~~ ~~ 3~ ~1 r~0 ~'~ ~~ 
0P~'  2~'~ 2P~'  0ei~ Qre~'  ?i~~ P~~ P~~ Qr~~ Qi~~ 0~ 0~ 0~ P~ 0~ 0~ 0~ P~ 0~ 2~ 0~ Qi~ 
,~ 
Figure 36. RQ 2.4: Sobig -Knowledge Type Proportions Over Time 
Research Question 3 -Sobig: Which media sources fit into the diffusion of innovation adopter 
categories: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards? 
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After sorting the sources that covered the Sobig computer security threat by first article date, 
the innovator category percentages created the following number of category members: two 
innovators, 13 early adopters, 32 in early majority, 32 in late majority, and 15 laggards. Of these 
categories, membership in these categories was as follows: innovator category —two wire services; 
early adopters —four newspaper, seven wire services, and two magazines/journals; early majority — 
13 newspapers, 14 wire services, and five magazines/journals; late majority — 25 newspapers and 
seven wire services; and laggards —six newspapers, one wire services, and seven magazines/journals. 
Table 4. RQ 3: Sobig -Adopter Categories 
*N=Newspaper, W=Wire, M=Magazine/Journal 
Innovators (2.5%) Early Majority (34%) 
Business Wire (W) PR Newswire (W) 
United Press International (W) Voice of America News (W) 
The Dominion Post (Wellington, New Zealand) (N) 
The New Zealand Herald (N) 
Early Adopters (13.5%) Computer Reseller News (M) 
Business Wire (W) AAP Newsfeed (W) 
United Press International (W) Computimes (Malaysia) (M) 
M2 Presswire (W) New Straits Times-Management Times (W) 
Newswire (VNU) (W) Computer Weekly (M) 
The Houston Chronicle (N) Business and Finance (M) 
eWeek (M) Canada Newswire (W) 
The Guardian (London) (N) Baltic News Service (W) 
The Independent (London) (N) Associated Press State &Local Wire (W) 
The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo) (N) Chicago Sun-Tribune (N) 
Smart Inc (M) Deutsche Presse-Agentur (W) 
Associated Press (W) Market Wire (W) 
Associated Press Online (W) Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Pennsylvania) (N) 
Associated Press Worldstream (W) Press Association (W) 
The Boston Globe (N) 
The New York Times (N) 
UPI Saudi Press Agency (W) 
Wall Street Journal (N) 
Agence France Presse -- English (W) 
Columbus Dispatch (Ohio) (N) 
ComputerWire (M) 
Courier Mail (Queensland, Australia) (N) 
Information Bank Abstracts (N) 
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel (Wisconsin) (N) 
Newsbytes (W) 
Omaha World Herald (Nebraska) (N) 
San Antonio Express-News (Texas) (N) 
TASS (W) 
Late Majority (34%) 
The Australian (N) 
THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON) (N) 
The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec) (N) 
The Nelson Mail (New Zealand) (N) 
The San Diego Union-Tribune (N) 
The San Francisco Chronicle (N) 
The Toronto Star (N) 
The Washington Post (N) 
Cox News Service (W) 
Financial Times (London, England) (N) 
Japan Economic Newswire (W) 
Ottawa Citizen (N) 
Philadelphia Inquirer (W) 
PR Newswire Europe (W) 
The Bulletin's Frontrunner (W) 
The Herald (Glasgow) (N) 
The Irish Times (N) 
The Toronto Sun (N) 
UPI - IRNA (W) 
Herald Sun (Melbourne, Australia) (N) 
Sacramento Bee (N) 
St. Petersburg Times (Florida) (N) 
Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN) (N) 
Tampa Tribune (Florida) (N) 
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (N) 
The Mercury (Australia) (N) 
The Scotsman (N) 
The Weekend Australian (N) 
AFX.com (W) 
Independent on Sunday (London) (N) 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) (N) 
Sunday Mail (SA) (N) 
Threat 5 - Zotob 
Laggards (16%) 
The Observer(N) 
The Straits Times (Singapore) (N) 
Economic News (W) 
Information Week (M) 
Multichannel News (M) 
South China Morning Post (N) 
The Daily Telegraph (Sydney, Australia) (N) 
The Press (Christchurch, New Zealand) (N) 
Chicago Sun-Times (N) 
The Economist (M) 
World Magazine (M) 
Maclean's (M) 
Newsweek(M) 
PC Magazine (M) 
Zotob spreads, instead of through e-mail, through network traffic that attacked a 
vulnerability in the Plug-and-Play service of unsecured Microsoft Windows systems. Attack network 
traffic tests for the existence of the vulnerability. If successful, a remote console into the vulnerable 
machine would then be opened allowing the worm to instruct the vulnerable machine to download 
programs from the originating/attacking system for infection. 
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Research Question 1- Zotob: What types of knowledge information about computer security 
issues are most commonly communicated in print media channels? 
Coverage of knowledge types for the Zotob computer security threat is half how-to 
knowledge, with principles-knowledge taking over three-quarters of the remaining half, when all 
media outlets are taken collectively: awareness- (10 percent), how-to (51 percent), and principles-
knowledge (39 percent). When taken individually, newspaper coverage offered even more how-to 
knowledge coverage (70 percent), with awareness- and principles-knowledge splitting the rest (13 
percent and 17 percent respectively). Wire service coverage was almost identical to the coverage 
overall (47 percent awareness-, nine percent how-to, and 44 percent principles-knowledge). 
Magazines and journals offered similar proportions to that of newspapers but with principles-
knowledge taking the majority (66 percent) and awareness- and how-to knowledge splitting the rest 











How-to Knowledge, 70% 
Figure 38. RQ 1: Zotob -Knowledge Type Coverage (Newspapers) 
Principles-Knowledge, 44% 
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How-to Knowledge, 47% 
Figure 39. RQ 1: Zotob -Knowledge Type Coverage (Wire Services) 
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Awareness-Knowledge, 17% 
How-to Knowledge, 17% 
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Figure 40. RQ 1: Zotob -Knowledge Type Coverage (Magazines 8~ Journals) 
Research Question 2.1- Zotob: How much time do media sources spend covering a computer 
security threat as the primary subject of articles? 
Print media coverage of the Zotob computer security threat began August 15, 2005 in wire 
services; newspapers started August 17, 2005 and magazines/journals started August 22, 2005. The 
beginning of coverage started six days after the threat was first noted (Microsoft Corp., 2005a). Unlike 
the first three threats, where protective measures were made available well before an exploit was 
discovered, protective measures were made available for the Zotob threat only one day prior to the 
warning of a potential exploit. The Zotob threat was first noted August 09, 2005 (Microsoft Corp., 
2005a) and the security bulletin was posted August 08, 2005 (Microsoft Corp., 2005b). Coverage lasted 
63 days, with current wire service coverage starting on the beginning day and lasting the full 63 days 
of coverage, newspaper coverage started two days later than wire services and lasted ten days (16 
66 
percent of the entire span), and magazine and journal coverage started seven days after wire services 
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Figure 41. RQ 2.1: Zotob -Coverage Span by Media Type 
15-Oct-05 
Research Question 2.2 - Zotob: How is coverage of a computer security issue distributed over the 
course of its coverage time span established in RQ 2.1? 
Zotob threat coverage is similar to the first threats analyzed so far. Coverage spiked as it had 
in the beginning of Nimda and SQLSlammer coverage, reaching 95 percent within 21 days of the start 
of coverage. Individually, newspapers spiked the quickest of all the media, rising from zero percent 
on day 1 to over 95 percent on day four. Wire services spiked similarly but started at day zero and 
reaching 95 percent in eleven days. Lastly, magazines and journal coverage spiked the slowest, 
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Figure 43. RQ 2.2: Zotob -Individual Coverage by Media Type Over Time 
Research Question 2.3 - Zotob: How many times does each media source cover the same computer 
security threat over the course of its coverage time span established in RQ 2.1? 
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The Zotob computer security threat was covered in 97 articles by 47 sources. Of these 47 
sources, six covered Zotob with four or more articles; one source published three articles, six 
published two articles, and 34 published one article. Of these sources 20 were newspapers (43 percent 
of sources), 22 were wire services (47 percent), and five were magazines/journals (eleven percent). 
The 43 percent newspaper sources produced 23 articles (24 percent of all coverage), the 47 percent 
wire service sources produced 68 articles (70 percent), and the 11 percent magazines/journal articles 
produced six articles (six percent). 
Of the top (those with four or more articles) six repeat sources of Zotob coverage, all of them 
were wire services. 
Others (1 each), 34 
Telecomworldwire, 2 
States News Service, 2 
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Figure 44. RQ 2.3: Zotob -Coverage Amount by Source 
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Research Question ~.4 - Zotob: Are certain types of knowledge information about computer 
security issues, established in RQ 1, more likely to occur during certain weeks of coverage (within 
the time span established in RQ 2.1)? 
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Coverage of the Zotob security threat was weighted toward how-to knowledge overall but 
the weeks up to 95 percent coverage were split almost completely between how-to (52 percent) and 
























Research Question 3 - Zotob: Which media sources fit into the diffusion of innovation adopter 
categories: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards? 
After sorting the sources that covered the Zotob computer security threat by first article date, 
the innovator category percentages created the following number of category members: one 
innovators, six early adopters, 16 in early majority, 16 in late majority, and eight laggards. Of these 
categories, membership in these categories was as follows: innovator category —one wire service; 
early adopters —all (eight) wire services; early majority —six newspapers and nine wire services; late 
majority —13 newspapers and three wire services; and laggards —five wire services and three 
magazines/journals. 
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Table 5. RQ 3: Zotob -Adopter Categories 
*N=Newspaper, W=Wire, M=Magazine/Journal 
Innovators (2.5%) Early Adopters (13.5%) 
M2 Presswire (W) PR Newswire US (W) 
Telecomworldwire (W) 
UPI (W) 
Associated Press Online (W) 
Associated Press State &Local Wire, The (W) 
Associated Press Worldstream (W) 
Early Majority (34%) 
Associated Press, The (W) 
Business Wire (W) 
Datamonitor (W) 
Advertiser, The (N) 
Gazeta Mercantil Invest News (W) 
InvestNews (Brazil) (W) 
Market Wire (W) 
New York Times, The (N) 
Newsbytes (W) 
Ottawa Citizen (N) 
San Francisco Chronicle, The (N) 
Seattle Times, The (N) 
Toronto Star, The (N) 
Washington Post, The (N) 
Xinhua General News Service (W) 
(Australian Associated Press) AAP Newsfeed (W) 
Late Majority (34%) 
Australian, The (N) 
Boston Globe, The (N) 
Business Times Singapore, The (N) 
Canadian Corporate Newswire (W) 
Courier Mail (Queensland, Australia), The (N) 
Daily News (New York) (N) 
Financial Times (London) (N) 
Houston Chronicle, The (N) 
Independent (London), The (N) 
Newsday (N) 
Pioneer Press, St. Paul, Minn. (W) 
Sacramento Bee (N) 
San Antonio Express-News (N) 
SinoCast (W) 
New Straits Times (Malaysia) (N) 
New Zealand Herald, The (N) 
All Threats Combined 
Laggards (16%) 
eWeek (M) 
Computer Weekly (M) 
States News Service (W) 
US Fed News (W) 
Deutsche Press-Agentur (W) 
ComputerWire (M) 
Information Security (M) 
Control Engineering Europe (M) 
After analyzing the coverage that five computer security threats received from mass media 
publications, some patterns emerged and some discrepancies showed up. These similarities and 
differences showed up in various areas: amount and length of coverage, knowledge levels presented, 
and earliness of coverage compared to threat release dates. 
Research Question 1: What types of knowledge information about computer security issues are 
most commonly communicated in print media channels? 
Coverage of knowledge types for all five computer security threats shows more articles were 
published presenting how-to knowledge (42 percent) and awareness-knowledge (35 percent). 
Principles-knowledge rounded off coverage by taking the final quarter (23 percent). When taken 
individually, newspaper coverage was split slightly more evenly between all knowledge types: 34 
percent awareness-knowledge, 38 percent how-to knowledge, and 28 percent principles-knowledge. 
Wire service coverage was almost identical to the overall coverage: 33 percent awareness-knowledge, 
44 percent how-to knowledge, and 23 percent principles-knowledge. Magazines and journals better 
reflected a focus on awareness- (40 percent) and how-to knowledge (40 percent), with 20 percent 
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Figure 46. RQ 1: All Threats -Knowledge Type Coverage 
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Figure 49. RQ 1: All Threats -Knowledge Type Coverage (Magazines &Journals) 
Research Question 2.1: How much time do media sources spend covering a computer security 
threat as the primary subject of articles? 
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Coverage spans for the five analyzed threats ranged from 63 days (Zotob) to 567 days (Klez); 
the average for all spans is 287 days. Individually, newspaper coverage ranged from ten days to 567 
days, averaging 247 days. Wire service coverage ranged from 63 days to 357 days, averaging 219 
days. Lastly, magazines and journals ranged from 32 days to 461 days, averaging 180 days. 
Research Question 2.2: How is coverage of a computer security issue distributed over the course of 
its coverage time span established in RQ 2.1? 
All threat time spans showed near vertical coverage spikes at some point in the timeline of 
current articles coinciding with the discovery of an exploit to the chosen vulnerability. Klez's 
coverage did offer a coverage spike, but over a greater number of days and not coinciding with the 
discovery of the threat (first discoveries were seen on October 26, 2001; F-Secure Anti-Virus Research 
Team, 2001, nearly three months prior to news coverage). On average, threats reached 95 percent 
coverage for their respective time spans within 150 days, ranging from 21 days (Zotob) to 423 days 
(Klez). 
When the lags were removed from Sobig (shifted 220 days) and Klez (shifted 70 days), the 
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Research Question 2.3: How many times does each media source cover the same computer security 
threat over the course of its coverage time span established in RQ 2.1? 
All the computer security threat resulted in 902 analyzed articles. All these articles were 
covered by 178 sources (79 newspapers, 65 wire services, and 34 magazines). Of these 178 sources, 47 
averaged at least five articles. Of the top article-producing sources, there were 20 that published nine 
or more: four newspapers, 15 wire services, and one magazine. Although of all the sources 44 percent 
were newspapers, 36 percent were wire services, and 19 percent were magazines/journals. These 
proportions were not reflected in the top 20 sources (20 percent newspapers, 75 percent wire services, 
and five percent magazines). 
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Others (1-2 each), 14%-
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Figure 52. RQ 2.3: A11 Threats -Coverage Amount by Source 
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Research Question 2.4: Are certain types of knowledge information about computer security 
issues, established in RQ 1, more likely to occur during certain weeks of coverage (within the time 
span established in RQ 2.1)? 
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Most of the security threats covered here started off with a portion of coverage in all of the 
knowledge types (Klez did not until the fifth week and although Sobig did start well split, it was 
unbalanced for many weeks until the coverage spike occurred, when it split up again). As weeks 
progressed in coverage, the balance of knowledge level coverage would tip to one level: Klez tended 
to bounce between awareness- and how-to knowledge, Nimda leaned toward awareness-knowledge, 
SQLSlammer became focused on how-to, Sobig bounced between how-to and principles-knowledge, 
and Zotob leaned toward awareness- and principles-knowledge (with a few weeks of single 
awareness-knowledge articles). 
Research Question 3: Which media sources fit into the diffusion of innovation adopter categories: 
innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards? 
After scoring the innovator categories (five for being an innovator down to one for being a 
laggard), the total sources were re-divided into categories based on the category percentages (2.5 
percent, 13.5 percent, 34 percent, 34 percent, and 16 percent). The final categories resulted in four 
innovators, 24 early adopters, 61 early majority members, 61 late majority members, and 281aggards. 
Final innovators consisted of four wire services; final early adopters consisted of nine newspapers 
and 15 wire services; final early majority consisted of 37 newspapers, 16 wire services, and eight 
magazines; final late majority consisted of 27 newspapers, 23 wire services, and eleven magazines; 
final laggards consisted of six newspapers, seven wire services, and 15 magazines. 
The composition of the innovator categories was relatively unbalanced. The innovator 
category was entirely wire services, early adopters was mostly wire services (62 percent) with the rest 
being newspapers, early majority shifted the majority to newspapers (64 percent) with the rest split 
between wire services (26 percent) and magazines/journals (13 percent), late majority shifted to split 
the majority mostly between newspapers (44 percent) and wire services (38 percent) with magazines 
~~ 
rounded it out (18 percent), and the laggards were mostly magazines (54 percent) with newspapers 
(21 percent) and wire services (25 percent) splitting the other half. 
Table 6. RQ 3: All Threats -Adopter Categories 
"N=Newspaper, W=Wire, M=Magazine/Journal 
Innovators (2.5%) Early Majority (34%) 
Business Wire (W) The Press (Christchurch, New Zealand) (N) 
PR Newswire (W) Toronto Star (N) 
M2 PRESSWIRE (W) Computer Reseller News (M) 
Associated Press (W) Computimes (Malaysia) (M) 
Cox News service (W) 
The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo) (N) 
Early Adopters (13.5%) The Independent (London) (N) 
Associated Press Online (W) The Observer (N) 
Associated Press Worldstream (W) The San Diego Union-Tribune (N) 
Associated Press State &Local Wire (W) Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN) (N) 
Newsbytes (W) The Advertiser (N) 
Newswire (VNU) (W) The Atlanta Journal-Constitution (N) 
Agency France Presse -- English (W) The Daily Telegraph (Sydney, Australia) (N) 
Canada Newswire (W) The New Zealand Herald (N) 
Deutsche Presse-Agentur (W) AAP NEWSFEED (W) 
United Press International (W) Canadian Corporate Newswire (W) 
The Houston Chronicle (N) Computer Weekly (M) 
Japan Economic Newswire (W) ComputerWire (M) 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Pennsylvania) (N) eWeek (M) 
Columbus Dispatch (Ohio) (N) Market Wire (W) 
Financial Times (London, England) (N) Milwaukee Journal Sentinel (Wisconsin) (N) 
Herald Sun (Melbourne, Australia) (N) New Straits Times-Management Times (W) 
The Guardian (London) (N) Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio) (N) 
XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE (W) PR Newswire Europe (W) 
AFX European Focus (W) Tampa Tribune (Florida) (N) 
Asia Pulse (W) The Australian (N) 
Internet Wire (W) The San Francisco Chronicle (N) 
Press Association (W) The Straits Times (Singapore) (N) 
San Antonio Express-News (Texas) (N) USA TODAY (N) 
South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) (N) Wall Street Journal (N) 
The New York Times (N) Courier Mail (Queensland, Australia) (N) 
Hobart Mercury (Australia) (N) 
New Straits Times (Malaysia) (N) 
Ottawa Citizen (N) 
The Bulletin's Frontrunner (W) 
The Dominion Post (Wellington, New Zealand) (N) 
The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec) (N) 
The Herald (Glasgow) (N) 
The Washington Post (N) 
Independent (London), The (N) 
Jiji Press Ticker Service (W) 
Network News (M) 
Omaha World Herald (Nebraska) (N) 
Sacramento Bee (N) 
Smart Inc (M) 
Telecomworldwire (W) 
THE DAILY TELEGRAPH (LONDON) (N) 
The Irish Times (N) 
The Scotsman (N) 
The Seattle Times (N) 
UPI (W) 
(Australian Associated Press) AAP Newsfeed (W) 
Advertiser, The (N) 
AFX -Asia (W) 
Asahi News Service (W) 
Baltic News Service (W) 
Buffalo News (New York) (N) 
Business and Finance (M) 
Business Newswire (W) 
Central News Agency -Taiwan (W) 
Chicago Sun-Tribune (N) 
Late Majority (34%) Laggards (16%) 
City News Service (W) The Oregonian (N) 
CTK Business News Wire (W) The Ottawa Citizen (N) 
Datamonitor (W) The Toronto Star (N) 
Electronics News (Australia) (M) The Weekend Australian (N) 
Gazeta Mercantil Invest News (W) UPI - IRNA (W) 
Information Bank Abstracts (N) Chain Store Age Executive with Shopping Center Age (M) 
Information Security (M) Chicago Sun-Times (N) 
Information Week (M) Control Engineering Europe (M) 
InvestNews (Brazil) (W) Direct (M) 
Malaysia General News (W) Economic News (W) 
Middle East Company News Wire (W) Editor and Publisher Magazine (M) 
New York Times, The (N) Factory Equipment News (Australia) (M) 
New Zealand Press Association (W) Gannett News Service (W) 
ONASA News Agency (W) Information Systems Auditor (W) 
OTS Originaltextservice (W) Iran News Agency (W) 
RIA Novosti (W) Library Journal (M) 
San Francisco Chronicle, The (N) Maclean's (M) 
Scripps Howard News Service (W) Multichannel News (M) 
Seattle Times, The (N) new.architect (M) 
St. Petersburg Times (Florida) (N) Newsweek (M) 
Sunday Mail (Queensland, Australia) (N) PC Magazine (M) 
TASS (W) School Library Journal (M) 
The Boston Globe (N) States News Service (W) 
The Business Times Singapore (N) Tele.Com (M) 
The Industry Standard.com (M) Times-Picayune (New Orleans, LA) (N) 
The Miami Herald (N) US Fed News (W) 
The Toronto Sun (N) What PC (M) 
UPI Saudi Press Agency (W) World Magazine (M) 
VNU NET (M) 
Voice of America News (W) 
Washington Post, The (N) 
AFX.com (W) 
Australian, The (N) 
Bahrain Tribune (W) 
Boston Globe, The (N) 
Business Times Singapore, The (N) 
CBNet (W) 
Computing (M) 
Daily News (New York) (N) 
Houston Chronicle, The (N) 
Infotech Weekly (M) 
Malaysia Economic News (W) 
Network Computing (M) 
New Zealand Herald, The (N) 
Newhouse News Service (W) 
Newsday (N) 
NZ Infotech Weekly (Wellington) (M) 
Philadelphia Inquirer (W) 
Pioneer Press, St. Paul, Minn. (W) 
Rocky Mountain News (Denver, CO) (N) 
Singapore News (N) 
SinoCast (W) 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri) (N) 
Sunday Herald Sun (Melbourne, Australia) (N) 
Sunday Mail (SA) (N) 
Taiwan Economic News (M) 
The Boston Herald (N) 
The Economist (M) 
The Evening Post (Wellington) (N) 
The Mercury (Australia) (N) 
The Nelson Mail (New Sealand) (N) 
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
This study attempted to analyze computer security threat news coverage in newspapers, 
magazines/journals, and wire services. The goal was to determine how threats are currently 
disseminated so as to better understand how threats could be so successful for such a long period of 
time after warnings were first released. Ultimately, this would serve as a basis for assisting with 
future efforts to improve communication of computer security threats to the public so that threats can 
be neutralized quickly or eliminated completely through user education about safer computing 
behavior. This analysis was performed on five computer security threats ranging from e-mail 
attachment threats to single network packet threats, all which took advantage of different 
vulnerabilities in their target machines. Each of these threats are analyzed with respect to six different 
questions. This chapter will look at the limits of this study, discuss the research questions, and offer 
potential future research possibilities. 
Limitations 
Before discussing the results of this study, it is important to address the potential 
shortcomings that may have affected the outcomes of this data. These limitations range from the 
source of the articles LexisNexis to the differences in the nature of the threats analyzed. 
LexisNexis, while an extensive source of information, is not comprehensive of all 
publications nor is it infallible. Searching for computer security threats across all newspapers became 
too large for LexisNexis to offer the full result set; a maximum of 1000 results is allowed. This meant 
that searching for articles was limited to the LexisNexis definition Of "major newspapers." As well, 
some sources appeared in multiple categories. For instance, the source Telecomworldwire showed up 
under some searches in magazines/journals and under wire services with the same articles (only wire 
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service articles were included in the sample in this case). Some sources in all media categories were 
also only available for limited time spans, excluding them from some or all threat timelines. While 
LexisNexis did appear to be comprehensive of the sources they include, there is no guarantee that 
articles were not missing. On the other hand, some derivative sources received multiple included 
articles although most of the coverage was identical. For example, Associated Press, Associated Press 
State &Local, Associated Press Online, and Associated Press Worldstream were all considered 
separate sources even though many times the same article was published to all four wire services. 
Another potential limitation of this search data was not a result of LexisNexis but of the 
computer security commercial industry as a whole. When threats are discovered, they are often 
named by the first to find them based on elements found within the computer code of the exploit 
itself. As time goes by, though, some anti-virus companies and security consulting firms may rename 
the threat to fit with their own naming conventions. As well, some threats are later determined to be 
variants of a previous exploit and are renamed as such, typically with the convention "Threat.[X]" 
where "X" is the next letter in the alphabet to be used on this base threat type. All of these names can 
sometime cause a number of problems with consumers and news agencies. This could also affect the 
results of searches for the most common threat names. These naming conventions are often 
conflicting between security groups; one companies new threat is another companies variant (Klez 
was considered by some to be a variant of the Palyh threat) and some companies simply use a 
different base name (such was the case for Zotob since some companies referred to it only by Mytob). 
If a threat is named by the variant syntax above, it will still show up in a search for the base term but 
if it is renamed to be a variant of another threat or renamed altogether, it would not have appeared in 
the LexisNexis results. 
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One of the biggest potential limitations of this data and analysis is the nature of the threats 
themselves. Although there may be trends that appear similar across threats, they were chosen 
because of their unique nature in the realm of computer security threats (three were e-mail-based 
exploits though only two were user-action triggered and one also targeted web servers 
simultaneously, one was asingle-packet attack directed at business-class servers but also attacking 
customers with database systems installed with commercial software, and one was anetwork-based 
attack that targeted older systems that were found primarily in business networks). While the 
coverage these threats receive may be an indication of a coverage trend for computer security threats 
in general, there is no guarantee that this trend is directly useful for predicting any one specific types 
of computer security threats (such as predicting anewly-discovered e-mail-based threat's coverage). 
Research Question 1: Knowledge Levels 
RQ 1: What types of knowledge information about computer security issues are most commonly 
communicated in print media channels? 
Across all computer security threats, how-to knowledge articles were the most prevalent, 
with awareness-knowledge taking second. How-to knowledge was the largest category of knowledge 
type articles in all media types (newspaper, magazines/journals, and wire services). In the case of 
computer security threat news, it is most important to notify computer users and support personnel 
of a means to protect themselves or the individuals for which they are responsible. This need for 
protective instructions makes how-to knowledge a requirement for properly covering a computer 
security threat and may have been the reason for this knowledge type being the most common. 
The prevalence of how-to articles in the wire service search results could also be a factor of 
the number of commercial press releases sent through these services. Many of the articles from all the 
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wire services were contributed by computer security companies, often with a commercial product to 
sell that would offer a means of protection to the end user for the threat in question (the very 
requirement of a how-to knowledge article). There is potential misuse of this type of system if a 
falsified press release were to make it into the hands of these news services. A similar problem 
occurred with the I-Newswire service in recent months when a high school sophomore, Thomas 
Vendetta, submitted a fake press release stating that Google had hired him as new employee (Ralph, 
2006). The student's fake story was then covered by News.com and Vendetta received a request for a 
TV interview. A malicious individual could spark a news frenzy by posting about anon-existent 
computer security threat or a company could push protection for a major computer security threat 
that they invented. 
SQLSlammer and Zotob were both threats that could be implemented without user 
interaction. As such, simply being aware of the problem would not offer computer users protection 
from the threat. This would explain why there was a large jump in articles when jumping to the how-
to knowledge level. 
Research Question 2: Time 
RQ 2.1: How much time do media sources spend covering a computer security threat as the 
primary subject of articles? 
The average span of current article coverage for the computer security threats is 287 days, 
ranging from 63 to 567 days. The coverage spans varied drastically across all threats (standard 
deviation being 197). This may indicate that the coverage of computer security threats is still 
unpredictable or that these threats are unique enough that coverage would be comparable only to 
other threats of their type. 
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Wire services were the first to start covering an issue on all threats but Klez. This may 
indicate that wire services should be watched to obtain the latest threat information but it could also 
simply be a result of the ability of wire services to publish quickly, without a publication schedule. 
Despite the fact that current coverage came to an end for these computer security threats in 
this study, the threats themselves can continue indefinitely. Compromised systems that fail to be 
repaired and malicious users that continue to attempt infection result in an inflated lifespan of a 
computer security threat. Attempted infections of some of the oldest threats are still reported by 
systems designed to act as honey pots to malicious traffic, recording all malicious traffic sent to it for 
analysis. The only change is that it becomes harder for users to be vulnerable as it becomes harder to 
run vulnerable software either due to newer software, failing vulnerable hardware, or any other 
possible factors. 
RQ 2.2: How is coverage of a computer security issue distributed over the course of its coverage 
time span established in RQ 2.1? 
Coverage in all threats showed a sharp spike at some point in the time span, though Sobig 
offered a spike well after the start of coverage and Klez's spike was much more gradual. The average 
time across all threats to reach 95 percent of current coverage was 150 days (106 days if the initial lag 
before the spike in Sobig coverage is excluded). The shortest spikes to 95 percent were seen in the 
computer threats that could potentially spread without user interaction. The quicker coverage may be 
a result of the severity of the threat, though in the case of such easily spread exploits, even expedited 
coverage could still be too slow to adequately protect computer systems. Considering the potential 
for computer security threats to infect vast numbers of computers even these spikes could still allow 
huge security violations around the world prior to adequate consumer awareness. 
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The lagged Sobig coverage spike may indicate that coverage becomes most prevalent after an 
exploit is released into the public rather than when the vulnerability underlying the threat is first 
discovered. 
RQ 2.3: How many times does each media source cover the same computer security threat over the 
course of its coverage time span established in RQ 2.1? 
The resulting numbers of articles published per source were well skewed toward wire 
services and this was reflected in the distribution of articles across media types (30 percent 
newspapers, 61 percent wire services, and ten percent magazines/journals). Given that there were 
only 65 wire sources for all wire articles, it is no surprise that wire services held 15 of the top 20 top 
article producers (four for newspapers and one magazine rounded out the top 20). This high 
percentage of wire articles could be a result of their ability to produce articles without any printing 
constraints. Newspapers would be bound to at least the next publication date to print articles about 
computer security threats while wire services may release stories at any point in the day. Magazines 
are even more affected by this delay; a newspaper may have to wait a day, a weekend, or even a 
week but a magazine or journal may only be published weekly, monthly, or quarterly. Depending on 
the date of discovery for a new threat or the release of protection measures, a magazine may be an 
entire month behind other print media. 
Relatively few sources were present in all five threat search results. In fact, only 26 percent 
(47 out of 178) of all sources had more than 5 articles across all results. The highest number of articles 
by one source were 65 by Business Wire and M2 Presswire, 62 by PR Newswire, 49 by Newsbytes, 
and 38 by Newswire. Again, these large numbers are easily produced when wire services do not have 
to depend on a daily, weekly, or monthly print deadline and new stories can simply be released. 
Despite these initial large numbers, 89 percent of sources had eight or less articles across all five 
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threats. This lack of consistent coverage across sources could be an indication of varied perceptions of 
the news value of computer security threats. Although Zotob directly affected a number of news 
outlets (CNN and New York Times, for example), the number of articles per sources was not the 
highest or lowest of all five threats (averages ranged from 1.68 articles per source [SQLSlammer] to 
3.21 articles per source [Nimda], with Zotob taking second with 2.06 articles per source) 
RQ 2.4: Are certain types of knowledge information about computer security issues, established in 
RQ 1, more likely to occur during certain weeks of coverage (within the time span established in 
RQ 2.1)? 
Knowledge level focus during coverage tended to vary for each threat. This lack of 
predictability may have come from the diverse nature of the computer security threats or from the 
still-relatively-new area of covering such threats. Just as many threats settled to focus on awareness-
knowledge as how-to knowledge later in the time span. 
For two of the threats analyzed here, Klez and Sobig, this research question's data was nearly 
unmanageable due to the extensive length of current coverage. For these charts to be of more use, 
Klez's weekly coverage would have to be narrowed to weeks eleven through 22. Sobig's weekly 
coverage would have to be narrowed to weeks 32 through 36 when its primary spike occurred. 
If this information diffusion followed the expectations of diffusion of innovation, adopters 
(media sources) would have started with awareness-knowledge as their initial focus, followed by 
how-to knowledge, and finally followed by principles-knowledge. While this data does reflect this 
idea as a collective adopting group, within individual sources it could be the case (something that 
could be addressed with more data given the limited number of sources that were found in all threat 
search results or with multiple articles about the same threat). On an individual basis, a transition 
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from awareness- to how-to to principles-knowledge would indicate the diffusion of innovation 
progression for an adopting unit. 
Research Question 3: Innovator Categories 
RQ 3: Which media sources fit into the diffusion of innovation adopter categories: innovators, 
early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards? 
Once all innovator categories had been assigned for each threat, they were combined by a 
point system (five for being an innovator on a threat down to one point for being a laggard, allowing 
zero for not being in a category for a particular threat). The final categories were fairly unique in their 
distribution across media types: innovators were all wire services, early adopters were mostly wire 
services (62 percent), early majority members were mostly newspapers (61 percent), late majority 
members were split mostly between wire services (38 percent) and newspapers (44 percent), and 
laggards were mostly magazines (54 percent). 
As was the case in other questions, these distributions could be a result of the level of ease 
with which a media source can publish articles. Wire services can push out new stories at any time, 
newspapers may be limited to a day's span (or week in some cases), and magazines/journals may be 
limited to a month's span (quarterly or more for some). A wire service can become an innovator or 
early adopter with a minimal amount of effort while even a newspaper or magazine that may have 
gained early knowledge would have to wait until the next publication cycle to present that 
information to their readers. Alternatively, if a threat hits after a day's publication cycle has 
concluded, sources that subscribe to wire services will have access to earlier knowledge of these 
threats before those that do not, allowing them to seem like an early adopter with minimal effort. 
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Future Research 
Being an initial study of media coverage of computer security threats, the results of this data 
can lead to more questions than answers. In this case, since the chosen threats were quite varied in 
their infection approaches, even though the coverage distributions over time were almost identical 
across all but two threats, the generalizability and extensibility of this data can be limited. If this 
relatively new type of media coverage has stabilized to a predictable point, future research may be 
needed to better determine the distribution attributes of coverage of computer security threats for 
specific threat types (i.e. the distribution for e-mail-based threats or the distribution for network-
based threats). This research may have stumbled upon a common distribution for all threats, the large 
coverage spike after a threat is released, or it may have identified three different types of trends that 
could be used to predict how a computer security threat may be covered by news media. More 
threats would have to be analyzed to determine if certain threats are more likely to fit the immediate 
coverage spike, the delayed spike (as seen in Sobig), or the more gradual increase (as seen in Klez). 
If this information diffusion followed the expectations of diffusion of innovation, adopters 
(media sources) would have started with awareness-knowledge as their initial focus, followed by 
how-to knowledge, and finally followed by principles-knowledge. While this data does reflect this 
idea as a collective adopting group, within individual sources it could be the case (something that 
could be addressed with more data given the limited number of sources that were found in all threat 
search results or with multiple articles about the same threat). On an individual basis, a transition 
from awareness- to how-to to principles-knowledge would indicate the diffusion of innovation 
progression for an adopting unit. 
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No matter what the distribution of news coverage, coordination will need to be made 
between making computer users aware of a threat and methods of protecting themselves and 
ensuring safer computer user behavior to help keep systems protected regardless of the threats they 
face. As well as securing the system through user behavior research will need to continue toward 
securing software from threats on the most basic level. 
Research that compares end-user awareness with coverage research of this style found in this 
study on emerging threats, similar to firehouse media research, would permit a thorough analysis of 
what types of media research are most effective in reducing threat infection potential. Correlations 
found in such research could be used to ensure that appropriate information is provided to diffusion 
agencies of all types, not just print media. 
Conclusion 
Regardless of the trends that appear in this research, there are a few key points that must be 
remembered. While a threat may stop receiving current media coverage, it does not go away. 
Computers can continue to scan for potential victims of old threats with minimal effort. Unprotected 
or already-infected machines can be brought back onto a network either in an attempt to revive them 
for new uses or recover old data, potentially re-exposing a network to a previously disregarded 
threat. Ultimately, it can be considered that threats do not go away, they simply become more 
difficult to "catch." Software becomes updated, networks become protected through firewalls and 
increased system security, or threats may attack vulnerabilities in software that is no longer used. As 
this process occurs, fewer and fewer systems are capable of becoming infected. 
With this continued threat from old exploits and the potential for new threats to pop up any 
day, it will always be just as important to educate users and administrators of safer computing 
practices. As well, work to keep users safe regardless of their actions can help limit the exposure of 
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new or revitalized threats. When a threat does become a problem, it is important to realize that the 
news coverage it receives will always be outpaced by its potential to spread. 
The computer security threats analyzed here did show a common trend of coverage. The 
difference between the coverage spike seen for the Klez threat and the coverage spikes seen in the 
remainder of the threats may simply imply an anomaly in the Klez coverage or two potential trends 
that media coverage might take. Despite these quick spikes in coverage by print media sources after 
the release of a new vulnerability-exploiting threat, how-to knowledge from any potential source will 
always be a requirement for slowing or stopping the spread of new threats. 
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APPENDIX: MALWARE DESCRIPTIONS 
This list contains all of the malware [considered for use/used] as search items in this study. 
Each one will have a list of common names (the most common is listed first if there is a clear winner), 
a first-noted date that indicates the believed release date of the exploiting software, a date patches 
were first made available (if available), and a short description of the type of exploit and/or methods 
used for dispersion. Entries are placed in a chronological order as much as possible given the first-
noted dates. 
Melissa a-mail (AKA Mailissa, Simpsons, Kwyj ibo, Kwej eebo) 
First Noted: March 26, 19991
Patch Available: March 30, 1999 (support page created2) 
Melissa was an e-mail-based exploit that contained a Microsoft Word document as an 
attachment. This document contained a macro virus (code that would run when the document was 
opened) that would e-mail itself to entries in the infected computers Microsoft Outlook address book 
(originally the first 50). The malicious code would also insert quotes from the television show "The 
Simpsons" into documents on the infected computer at pre-specified times/days3
ILOVEYOU (AKA VBS/Loveletter, Love Bug worm) 
First Noted: May 03, 20004
Patch Available: not found 
ILOVEYOU was an e-mail-based exploit that contained a VBScript worm as an attachment. 
The e-mail was disguised as a love letter for the recipient, giving its namesake with subject lines like 
"ILOVEYOU" and attachments named "LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU.TXT.vbs" (a VBScript file 
disguised as a text file). When run, this worm would contribute to adenial-of-service on the White 
House web site, overwrite numerous multimedia files with a copy of itself, send itself to entries in the 
infected computer's contact list, and add itself to the Windows registry to start up every time the 
computer boots. 
Code Red 
First Noted: July 13, 20015
Patch Available: June 18, 20016
Code Red was an attack on Microsoft's Internet Information Services (IIS), a web page 
hosting environment, exploiting a buffer overflow vulnerability in the indexing software of that 
service. When executed, the worm would deface the hosted web site with a message ("HELLO! 
Welcome to http://www.worm.com! Hacked By Chinese!"~), attempt to spread randomly to other IP 
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of notable computer viruses_and_worms 
2 http://web.archive.org/web/20000229092520/http://support.microsoft.com/support /kb/articles/g224/5/67.asp 
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Melissa %28worm%29 
4 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VBS/Loveletter 
5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_Red_%28computer worm%29 
6 
http://v~►~ww.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MSO1-033.mspx 
~ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_Red_%28computer worm%29 
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addresses running IIS, and would wait 20-27 days to launch adenial-of-service attack on a fixed list 
of IP addresses that included the White House web site). 
Code Red II 
First Noted: August 04, 2001$ 
Patch Available: June 18, 20019
Code Red II was an attack, similar to Code Red, on Microsoft's Internet Information Services 
(IIS), a web page hosting environment, exploiting a buffer overflow vulnerability in the indexing 
software of that service. Code Red II had a much more likely chance of attempting to infect machines 
on the same subnet of IP addresses than the original did. It would also install a back door that would 
allow the retrieval of files from the infected computer by offering them up as hosted web pages.10
Nimda 
First Noted: September 18, 200111
Patch Available: October 17, 200012 (UNICODE) and March 29, 200113 (MIME) 
Nimda attacked on multiple vectors: through web servers running Internet Information 
Services (IIS), through visitors to infected web servers, and through an e-mail based exploit. IIS 
servers were attacked through either a directory traversal vulnerability or back doors left by previous 
Code Red II infections14. Infected web servers had their pages modified to serve up infected files to 
visitors. Infected e-mails contained an executable (EXE) file called "README.EXE"15. When executed, 
this program would infect other EXE files on the machine, mass mail itself to e-mail addresses found 
in local HTML files, scan internet IP addresses for vulnerable web page servers (modifying random 
pages), and would search local file shares where it would place a file called "RICHED20.DLL" in any 
directory where it found DOC or EML files (these DOC and EML files would execute code in the 
placed file when used)16_ 
Klez 
First Noted: November 11, 200117
Patch Available: March 29, 2001 (fix directions first posted)18
Klez was an e-mail based exploit that took advantage of a vulnerability in Microsoft Internet 
Explorer (used to render HTML a-mails in Microsoft Outlook and Microsoft Outlook Express). An 
infected e-mail would contain attachments, one of which was the worm's code, that would be 
executed automatically when the e-mail was displayed by Microsoft Internet Explorer or through 






















executed, Klez would search for e-mail addresses on the infected machine for use in self-propagation. 
It could also send files found on the infected machine as attachments in the propagation e-mails. 
SQL Slammer worm (AKA Saphire worm) 
First Noted: January 25, 200319
Patch Available: July 24, 200220 and October 16, 200221
SQL Slammer was an exploit of a buffer overflow on Microsoft SQL Server and Microsoft 
Desktop Engine (MSDE) database products (though not actually using the Structured Query 
Language). When executed, this small piece of code would quickly generate random IP address for 
attempted infection spreading. This quick code created adenial-of-service scenario on many Internet 
hosts through the quick consumption of bandwidth. Since the code only remained in memory, the 
attack could be easily removed, though without patching, a system would have become infected 
again quickly at the height of this exploit's existence. 
Blaster (AKA Lovsan, Lovesan, MSBlast[.EXE]) 
First Noted: August 11, 200322
Patch Available: July 16, 200323
The Blaster exploit was a buffer overflow of the DCOM (Distributed Component Object 
Model) RPC (Remote Procedure Call) service. When performed on a susceptible computer, Blaster 
would begin scanning for other IP addresses, using to random generation methods, to infect and also 
open up a port on the infected machine that would send out MSBlast.EXE when triggered. Blaster 
was also programmed to start adenial-of-service attack on windowsupdate.com at a specified date 
from all infected machines24. 
Welchia (AKA Nachia) 
First Noted: August 18, 200325
Patch Available: July 16, 200326
Welchia was an exploit of the same buffer overflow used in Blaster but was intended to patch 
infected systems from future attacks by downloading updates from Microsoft using a TFTP (Trivial 
File Transfer Protocol). Although intended to cause no harm to the end user, it would operate 
without the "infected" user's knowledge, increase network traffic, and restart the machine. 
Sobig (AKA Sobig, Palyh) 
First Noted: January 09, 200327
Patch Available: January 30, 2002 (security advisory posted)28
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Sobig was an a-mail based attack that contained a PIF (Program Information File) attachment. 
E-mails were composed of subjects and attachment names designed to lure recipients to open the 
attachment. When the PIF file was executed, it would gather e-mail addresses from files (.dbx, .eml, 
.hlp, .htm, .html, .mht, .wab, .txt) on the infected system for use in spreading. Some variants of the 
Sobig worm would deactivate themselves at a predetermined date.29
Sober 
First Noted: October 24, 200330
Patch Available: Not found 
Sober was an e-mail based attack that contained a malicious attachment. The e-mail body and 
subject were designed to lure recipients to open the attachment (one variant was disguised to be a 
letter from the FBI or CIA claiming the recipient had been caught visiting illegal websites and asking 
them to open the attachment to answer questions).31 The exploit, when run, would deactivate several 
antivirus software packages, copy itself to a system executable, and would e-mail itself to the infected 
machine's address book via an embedded SMTP engine in the exploit. 
Mydoom (AKA Novarg, Mimail.R, Shimgapi) 
First Noted: January 26, 200432
Patch Available: January 26, 200433
Mydoom was an e-mail based attack that contained a malicious attachment. The e-mail was 
disguised as a transmission error message, with subjects such as "Error", "Mail Delivery System", 
"Test", and "Mail Transaction Failed" (sometimes in different languages). The malicious attachment, 
when executed, would resend itself to e-mails found in local files like the address book (avoiding 
certain universities and companies), copy itself to shared folders of KaZaA (a peer-to-peer file sharing 
application), install a backdoor running as a child process for remote control of the machine, and 
attempt adenial-of-service on the SCO Group web site. 
Witty 
First Noted: March 18, 200434
Patch Available: March 28, 200435
Witty attacked an exploit in the firewall of a company called Internet Security Systems 
(included in RealSecure Networks, RealSecure Server Sensor, RealSecure Desktop, and BlackICE 
software packages). Beginning its infection on March 19, 200436, Witty infected 12,000 computers in 30 




















running, Witty would attempt infection of other computers through random IP addresses as quick as 
it could output packets (in groups of 20,000). Witty was also thought to overwrite hard disk sections. 
Sasser 
First Noted: April 30, 200437
Patch Available: April 13, 200438
Sasser exploited a buffer overflow vulnerability in the Local Security Authority Subsystem 
Service (LSASS) of Microsoft Windows XP and Windows 2000. When infected, a computer would 
scan different ranges of IP addresses and attempt to spread to them through the exploit. The Sasser 
attack was suspected to have been constructed from areverse-engineering of the patch made 
available to fix the vulnerability, allowing the infection of those that did not apply the patch. Sasser 
brought down the satellite communication of Agence France-Presse (AFP) and forced the cancellation 
of several trans-Atlantic flights after swamping Delta Airlines systems. 
Santy 
First Noted: December 20, 200439
Patch Available: "One month prior"4o 
Santy attacked PHP web server system using the phpBB software. Spreading of the Santy 
worm was facilitated by Google searches for future susceptible systems (later blocked by Google). 
When exploiting a PHP web server, Santy would deface PHP and HTML files to display a 
programmed message ("This site is defaced!!! This site is defaced!!! NeverEverNoSanity WebWorm 
generation [X]", where [X] is the variant of the worm41) 
Zotob (AKA Rbot.cbq, SDBot,bzh) 
First Noted: August 09, 200542
Patch Available: August 08, 200543
Zotob exploited a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows' Plug-and-Play system (allowing new 
hardware to be added without requiring a restart of the system). The attack could allow for remote 
control of the attacked system but typically caused continual restarts. The Zotob attack gained news 
coverage when it took down systems on CNN during live broadcast. Zotob also infected computers 
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